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INTRODUCTION

No physician.. .considers his own good in what he
prescribes, but the good of his patient;for the true physician
is... not a mere moneymaker.
-Plato, The Republic
Consider the following hypothetical.' Jane Doe, a thirty-four year-old
wife and mother of two, visits her primary care physician complaining of
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1. The facts of this hypothetical are loosely based on the facts of an actual 1995
lawsuit. Although the case did not yield a published opinion, an account of the suit and
the trial can be found in the following sources: Henry T. Greely, Direct Financial
Incentives in Managed Care: Unanswered Questions, 6 HEALTH MATRIX 53, 75-77
(1996); CaliforniaJury Awards $3 Million to Family of Deceased CancerPatient,BNA
Nov. 27, 1995, at D5; Paul Elias, Doctors Negligent in Woman's
Cancer Death, Jury Finds, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1995, at A3; Paul Elias, Trial No
Longer a Managed Care Test Case, L.A. TIEs, Nov. 10, 1995, at A3; David R. Olmos,
HEALTH CAPE DAILY,

CuttingMedical Costs-OrCorners?,L.A. TIMES, May 5, 1995, at Al.

abdominal and pelvic pain and rectal bleeding. Her physician performs
a pelvic exam and finds a palpable mass. He thinks the mass is probably

a fibroid tumor, a benign condition that poses few health risks. He
orders an ultrasound to confirm the diagnosis. Although the results of
the ultrasound are inconclusive, he stands by his initial diagnosis. Since
fibroid tumors are often simply monitored rather than treated, he tells
Doe to come back in six months. Doe is a little concerned that her

physician is not 100% certain that the mass is a fibroid tumor, but she
trusts him when he tells her that additional tests or referral to a specialist
are unnecessary.
The pain and bleeding don't go away, and Doe goes back to her doctor
two more times over the next four months. Finally, on her third visit,
her doctor orders a barium enema x-ray. The x-ray shows that Doe has
colon cancer. Colon cancer, if detected early, is highly treatable. The
five-year survival rate can be as high as 80%. Doe was not so lucky.

Less than two years after the diagnosis, she is dead.
Doe's health plan was paid for by her employer. In the late 1980s,
Doe's employer became frustrated with the rapidly rising cost of

traditional indemnity type insurance 2 and began looking into managed
care.3

The company finally decided to contract with a health

2. Under traditional indemnity insurance, doctors are paid on a fee-for-service
basis. A patient decides to see a doctor, the doctor bills the insurance company, and, in
all but the rarest cases, the insurance company pays the doctor. This reimbursement
system is called fee-for-service (FFS) because the doctor receives a fee for every service
she performs. Physicians who are paid on a FFS basis have a strong incentive to perform
as many services as the insurance company will pay for. According to some, "the FFS
system of American medicine is the root of all the problems we face with high costs."
PETER R. KONGSTVEDT, THE MANAGED HEALTH CARE HANDBOOK 139 (3rd ed. 1996).
This is, of course, an oversimplification. Many other factors have contributed to the high
costs of medical care in the United States, including the fear of malpractice, an increase
in expensive new technologies, an aggressive medical culture, and the aging of the
American population. See, e.g., VICTOR R. FuCHs, THE FuTURE OF HEA TrH POLICY 159
(1993) (arguing that the increase in health care costs is driven by the practice of
defensive medicine, i.e., performing services, primarily as protection against malpractice
suits, which provide little or no benefit to patients); BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH
LAW CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 662 (2d ed. 1991) (discussing how aging of the
American population has contributed to a rise in health care costs); Peter Franks et al.,
Gatekeeping Revisited-Protecting Patients From Overtreatment, 327 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 424, 424 (1992) (noting increased health care costs driven by fee-for-service
medicine, fears of malpractice liability, the costs of new technologies, an aggressive
medical culture, increased patient expectations, and an oversupply of specialists).
3. See GEORGE ANDERS, HEALTH AGAINST WEALTH 16-34 (1996) (describing a
Fortune 500 company's switch to managed care after health care costs increased 39% in
one particularly bad year, and discussing history of employer-provided health insurance);
KAREN DAVIS ET AL., HEALTH CARE COST CONTAINMENT 104-08 (1990) (describing how
the rising cost of health benefits in 1980s changed corporate attitudes and noting that
cost containment measures moved quickly from being unacceptable to becoming
standard practice).
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maintenance organization (HMO)" to provide its employees' health
care.5 When Doe first enrolled in the HMO, she was given a list of the
HMO's primary care physicians (PCPs)6 and told to select one. All of
her non-emergency health care had to be provided or approved by her
PCP. If Doe needed care that the PCP could not provide, the PCP could
refer Doe to a specialist. Her PCP also had to order or approve all
diagnostic tests. Because PCPs control their patients' access
7 to the rest
of the health care system, they are often called gatekeepers.
Although Doe had a vague notion of what managed care was all
about, she didn't know much about how managed care had
revolutionized the way that physicians are paid.9 Doe's HMO paid its
4. HMOs are health care organizations that finance and deliver specified health
care services for their members. See KONGSTVEDT, supra note 2, at 34-35. Unlike
traditional indemnity insurance plans, which reimburse patients or their health care
providers for the costs of medical services after the fact, HMOs actually provide medical
services to their members through affiliations with health care providers. See id.
5. Employers began turning to HMOs in the 1980s for one reason: to save money.
Although there is some evidence that the gap may be narrowing, premiums for HMOs
have consistently been lower than premiums for either conventional fee-for-service plans
or other types of managed care plans. In 1997, for example, the average monthly family

premium was $503 for a conventional fee-for-service plan, $444 for a plan that utilizes a
preferred provider organization (PPO), and $430 for an HMO. See HEALTH INSURANCE
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, SOURCE BOOK OF HEALTH INSURANCE DATA 21 (1997-98).
These cost savings did not go unnoticed. In 1980, 4% of the U.S. population was
enrolled in an HMO. See DAVIS ET AL., supra note 3, at 141. By 1995, enrollment had
risen to 21.7%. See HEALTH INSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA at 59. HMO
penetration is even higher-33% in 1997-among those who have employer-provided
health insurance. See id. at 58.
6. Primary care physicians are generally physicians who specialize in family
practice, internal medicine, or pediatrics. See KONGSTVEDT, supra note 2, at 87, 120. In
order to give women better access to their OB/GYNs, some states have statutorily
expanded the definition of a primary care physician. See, e.g., CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10,
§ 1300.45 (1998) (defining primary care physician as a general practitioner, internist,
pediatrician, obstetrician-gynecologist, or family practitioner).
7. See KONGSTEVEDT, supra note 2, at 994.
8. The term managed care is broad and generally refers to any technique used to
keep medical costs down by reducing medically unnecessary care and to ensure that
medically necessary care is provided in the most cost effective way possible. Managed
care organizations accomplish these goals by using a wide variety of techniques,
including utilization review; promoting preventive medicine and earlier identification of
disease; requiring pre-authorization or second opinions for certain procedures; and
capitation and other financial incentives for providers and patients. Today, 98% of all
health plans use at least one of these techniques. See HEALTH INSURANCE ASSOCIATION
OF AMERICA, supranote 5, at 58.
9. There are three basic methods of compensating physicians: fee-for-service;
salary; or capitation. Fee-for-service (FFS) compensation, along with the incentive it
provides to overtreat, is described in note 2. The second compensation method, salary, is

PCPs on a capitated basis. Under capitation, the PCP receives a set

amount per month for each patient.'

In return for this capitation

payment, the PCP is expected to provide all primary care services." The

PCP receives the same capitation payment for each patient, regardless of
how much or how little care the patient actually receives. The PCP is
thus put at financial risk that the cost of caring for a patient could exceed
the capitation payment.' 2 Proponents of capitation argue that this risk
will make doctors more cost conscious, cut down on medically
unnecessary care, and help lower medical costs."
In addition to capitating the PCPs own services, many lIMOs also put

PCPs at financial risk for the costs of diagnostic tests or referrals to
specialists. After all, the potential gains of capitation could quickly be4
lost if physicians ordered excessive tests or made excessive referrals.
Some HLMOs require physicians to use their capitation payments to
cover the costs of all tests and referrals. 5 Other HMOs use withholds
and risk pools. 6 Under this method, a percentage of each capitation
payment is withheld and pooled with withholds from other PCPs. The
risk pool is then used to pay for diagnostic tests, referrals to specialists,
and hospitalizations. 7 If there is money left in the pool at the end of the
year, it is divided among the physicians. Since each test or referral
used primarily by staff model HMOs, which pay their physicians a salary to provide care
to their members. Kaiser is probably the best known example of a staff model HMO.
The third method, capitation, is described in this section of the Article.

10. See KONGSTVEDT, supra note 2, at 121-24 (defining capitation); see also
DAVID W. LEE, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CAPITATION: THE PHYSICIANS' GUIDE
(Mark J. Segal et al. eds., 1995). This Article's discussion of capitation relies heavily on
both of these sources.
11. The contract between the HMO and the PCP will, or should, define precisely
what primary care services the PCP is expected to provide. See LEE, supra note 10, at 14
(stressing importance of precisely defining services subject to capitation, and noting that
"[s]implistic definitions such as 'primary care services within the physician's scope of
practice' are too vague and may lead to future misunderstandings").
12. Some commentators call this type of risk "service risk" rather than "financial
risk." It is called service risk because of the potential that the PCP will need to perform
a high volume of services for the same capitation payment. The term financial risk, on
the other hand, is limited to payment methods that actually place the PCP's income at
risk. See KONGSTVEDT, supra note 2, at 124. In this Article, the term financial risk is
used to refer to both types of risk.
13. See id. at 135 (noting HMOs use capitation because it "eliminates the FFS
incentive to overutilize and brings the financial incentives of the capitated" provider in
line with the financial incentives of the HMO").
14. Most specialists are still paid on a fee-for-service basis rather than a capitated
basis. See id. at 179-81.
15. See id. at 134 (explaining "full-risk" capitation).
16. See id. at 129-31.
17. See id. at 130-31.
18. Most IMOs track which doctors are making referrals, or authorizing
hospitalizations and ancillary tests. In some HMOs, if an individual doctor's rate is too
high, they do not share in what is left in the risk pool. See id. at 131. Note also that not
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depletes the pool, the physician has an incentive to provide care in the
most economical manner possible in order to recover some of the
withheld money.
Jane Doe's HMO used a combination of both methods. Her PCP had
to pay for the costs of all diagnostic tests, and a risk pool was used to
pay for referrals to specialists. Unfortunately for Doe, neither her HMO

nor her PCP had ever explained this complex payment system to her. If
they had, she might have questioned her physician more thoroughly
when he told her she didn't need additional tests or a referral to a
specialist.
Doe's husband thinks that his wife was killed by greed. He believes
that if his wife's physician had ordered the barium enema x-ray on her
first visit, his wife would be alive today. He also believes that the
physician dragged his feet in ordering the test because the cost came out
of his own pocket. He says that if he and his wife had known about how
her physician was paid, they would gladly have borne the cost of the
$250 x-ray themselves.
Stories like this are becoming increasingly common.19 As of yet, there
is no conclusive evidence that managed care financial incentives lead to
an inappropriate under-treatment of patients or a lower quality of health
care." However, the public's perception seems to be that HMOs and
their physicians are putting money before medicine, and, as one
commentator has noted, "the public is prepared to view certain payment
all HMOs use capitation or risk pools to pay for services not provided directly by the
primary care physician. Some HMOs will pay for these services in other ways, but will

give physicians incentives to control costs by offering them bonuses for meeting
performance, cost, or utilization goals. See id. at 97.
19. See, e.g., Michael Pulley, Kaiser,Heal Thyself, SAC. NEws & REv., Apr. 30,
1998, at 15, 18 (reporting on two patients who believe that cost cutting compromised
quality of care and describing treatment of some patients by IMOs as "health-care
horror stories"); Michael Meyer & Andrew Murr, Not My Health Care, NEvSWEEK, Jan.
10, 1994, at 36-37 (recounting stories of two women who had to sue their HMOs to get
coverage for bone marrow transplants to treat breast cancer); Daniel Q. Haney & Fred

Bayles, Paying a Price for Cost-Conscious HMO's, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 28, 1990, at A3
(recounting stories of several patients who believe their physicians withheld care because
of financial incentives).

20. See, e.g., David Orentlicher, Health Care Reform and the Patient-Physician
Relationship, 5 HEALTH MATRIX 141, 161-66 (1995) (reviewing a number of studies on

how financial incentives impact quality of care and concluding that the available data
suggests financial incentives do not significantly compromise patient care). Note that
although the source cited says that the available research does not show that financial
incentives decrease quality of care, their potential to do so, along with anecdotal
evidence provided by individual patients, provides reason for concern.

methods as bribes to ration care."'

There is no shortage of ideas on how to deal with financial incentives.
Proponents of financial incentives argue that such incentives can
eliminate medically unnecessary care and help put a lid on rapidly rising
health care costs;2 proponents also argue that financial incentives can
achieve these goals without sacrificing quality.2'
Critics fear that

financial incentives will compromise patient care by causing physicians

to put their own self-interest before the best interests of their patients. 24
Among critics, some argue that financial incentives 2should be

prohibited,' while others argue that they should be regulated.
21.

William M. Sage, 'Health Law 2000': The Legal System And The Changing

Health Care Market, 15 HEALTH AFFARS 9, 18 (1996); see also Robert W. Geist,

Incentive Bonuses in PrepaymentPlans,291 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1306 (1974) (noting that
all financial incentives have the goal of influencing physician's medical decisions for the
benefit of the organization "paying the bribe").
22. See, e.g., Alain C. Enthoven, Shattuck Lecture-Cutting Cost Without Cutting
the Quality of Care, 298 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1229, 1229-30, 1234 (1978) (stating that in
any "economically rational health plan" physicians must accept responsibility for the use
of resources, and that lower cost does not need to mean lower quality); Haney & Bayles,
supra note 19, at A3 (reporting that proponents tout HMOs' ability to deliver costconscious medicine by financially incentivizing physicians to avoid unnecessary tests
and treatment).
23. See, e.g., Franks et al., supra note 2, at 424-25 (arguing that financial
incentives can actually improve quality of care by decreasing medically unnecessary care
and iatrogenic complications associated with unnecessary care); DAvis ET AL., supra note
3, at 203 (noting that, if physicians were provided with both better scientific knowledge
and financial incentives, quality of care could increase at the same time health care costs
decreased).
24. See, e.g., Alan L. Hillman, FinancialIncentives for Physicians in HMOs. Is
There a Conflict of Interest?, 317 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1743, 1747 (suggesting that certain
types of financial incentives may cause physicians to withhold too much care); Haney &
Bayles, supra note 19, at A3 (noting that there is a worry that some financial incentives
may be so strong they will tempt doctors to err in favor of doing too little).
25. See, e.g., Orentlicher, supra note 20, at 169-70 (noting that some
commentators argue that financial incentives be prohibited entirely because "there is no
objective method for defining 'too dangerous' an incentive, and the definition chosen
may fall short of that needed to protect patient welfare"); Arnold S. Relman, Dealing
With Conflicts of Interest, 313 NEW ENG. J. MED. 749, 751 (1985) (arguing that
physicians be required to avoid "financial interests in medical marketplace"); Geist,
supra note 21, at 1308 (recommending that federal and state governments outlaw
financial incentives).
26. See, e.g., MARC A. RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY, AND MORALS: PHYSICIANS'
CONFLICrs OF INTEREST 146, 225 (1993) (detailing strength and weakness of different
types of financial incentives, and recommending that some of the strongest ones be
prohibited); Orentlicher, supra note 20, at 167-69 (recommending that financial
incentives which have high potential for abuse be prohibited, and identifying such
incentives by amount of risk borne by physician, whether incentives are tied to

physicians individually or as group, and length of time over which performance is
measured). The federal government has recently regulated the use of financial incentives
by HMOs that have contracts to provide services to Medicare and Medicaid
beneficiaries. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 417.479, 434.67 (1997) (requiring that physicians have
stop-loss protection if the HMO places their income at substantial financial risk, and
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This Article advocates disclosure as a compromise between
wholeheartedly embracing financial incentives and flatly prohibiting
them, and suggests using fiduciary law to compel such disclosure. This
Article also argues that courts should recognize a cause of action for
breach of fiduciary duty when a physician fails to disclose managed care
financial incentives to her patients. Part I gives a brief overview of
fiduciary law and fiduciary duties. Part II examines the fiduciary nature
of the physician-patient relationship and looks at court cases that have
characterized the physician-patient relationship as a fiduciary
relationship. Part Ill discusses the only two published opinions that
have addressed the issue of whether a patient can bring a breach of
fiduciary claim against a physician. Building on these two cases, Part

IV recommends that courts recognize a cause of action for breach of
fiduciary duty for failure to disclose managed care financial incentives
and discusses the remedies for breach. Finally, Part V examines the

defining substantial financial risk as between 25-33% of physician's total income,
depending on how risk is structured; also prohibiting HMOs from directly or indirectly
using incentives to reduce or limit medically necessary services to individual patients).
Stop-loss protection is a form of reinsurance that protects PCPs who are paid on a
capitated basis. Once the costs of caring for an individual patient, or a group of patients,
exceeds the stop-loss amount, the reinsurance kicks in and the physician will either be
reimbursed for the excess costs, or the excess costs will not be counted against, and
deducted from, the risk pool. See KONGSTVEDT, supra note 2, at 132. Several states
have also passed or are considering legislation that would limit the types and amounts of
financial incentives that HMOs can use. See, e.g., TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 20A.14(1)
(West Supp. 1998) (stating that HMOs may pay physicians on capitated basis, but
prohibiting HMOs from using "any financial incentive or make any payment to a
physician or provider that acts directly or indirectly as an inducement to limit medically
necessary services"); H.B. 1843, 81st Reg. Sess. (Ak. 1997) (prohibiting health plans

from using financial incentives to induce "less than medically necessary and appropriate
care," stressing that nothing in the bill shall be deemed to prohibit capitation, and giving
insurance commissioner authority to develop standards regarding financial incentives);
S.B. 2602, 1997 Reg. Sess. (Miss. 1997) (requiring health plans to provide adequate
stop-loss protection for physicians if they are placed at financial risk for services they do
not actually provide, and directing department of insurance to develop standards of
adequacy based on the number of physicians and patients in group); H.B. 2453, 182nd
Gen. Ass., 1997-98 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 1998) (giving the secretary of health authority to
prohibit incentives that "could have the capacity to lead to inadequate or poor quality
care"); see also Geraldine A. Collier, Chandler Touts Managed Care Bill; Measure
Would Regulate HMOs, TELEGRAM & GAZETrE, Sept. 11, 1997, at B1 (reporting on bill
being considered by Massachusetts legislature that would limit financial incentives to
5% of doctor's salary); HMO DisclosureLegislation:Slow Movement by States, HEALTH
LINE, Sept. 5, 1997 (noting that HMO disclosure laws being considered by states touch
on "new, controversial area: the financial incentives HMOs provide doctors to limit or
deny care").

benefits and limits of disclosure as a way of dealing with financial
incentives.
I.

WHAT Is A FIDucIARY AND How Do I KNOW
ONE WHEN I SEE ONE?

No man can serve two masters: for either he will hate the
one, and love the other; or else he will hold to the one, and
despise the other.
-Matthew, 6:24
The term fiduciary comes from the Latin wordfidere, which means to
trust.27 The fiduciary concept originated in the law of trusts,28 and
trustees were probably the earliest fiduciaries. 9 A trustee is someone
who takes title to property with the understanding that she will manage
the property for the benefit of someone else, who is called the
beneficiary.0 This situation obviously creates a huge potential for abuse.
How can the beneficiary stop the trustee from violating the trust by
using the property for herself or absconding with the property?
Early common law courts were ill-equipped to deal with this situation.
Since the trustee had title to the property, common law courts could
offer the beneficiary no relief.'
Ecclesiastical and equitable courts,
however, found this situation intolerable. They were willing to enforce
the trust and compel trustees to act faithfully. 2 The fiduciary concept
27. See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 501 (2d College ed. 1985). The same
Latin root also gave us fidelis, which means loyal, and fides, which means faith, trust,
and fidelity. See FREDERIC M.WHEELOCK, LATIN 420 (3d ed. 1963).
28. See Ernest J. Weinrib, The Fiduciary Obligation, 25 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 3
(1975); Romvw, supranote 26, at 181.
29. Actually, the feoffee to uses were probably the earliest fiduciaries. See JESSE
DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 564 (5th ed.
1995). The medieval use, which first appeared in England in the 13th century, is the
ancestor of the modem trust. See id. The use was employed to get around laws
mandating that all land descended to the eldest son (primogeniture) and laws prohibiting
the clergy from owning property. See id. A use worked much like a trust. A landowner
would convey legal title to land to a trustworthy person, called a feoffee to uses, with the
understanding that the feoffee to uses would hold the land for the use and benefit of
someone else, called the cestui que use. See id. The use was abolished in 1535 by the
Statute of Uses, but was quickly replaced by the trust. See id. at 564-65.
30. See id. at 568; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTnONARY 1514 (6th ed. 1990)
(defining trustee).
31. See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 29, at 564.
32. See id. (noting evidence that ecclesiastical courts may have enforced uses even
before equity courts did); see also Tamar Frankel, FiduciaryLaw, 71 Cal. L. Rev. 795,
(1983) (noting ecclesiastical and equity courts were the first courts with jurisdiction over
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was thus initially created to deal with the problem of disloyal trustees.
The fiduciary concept did not remain confined to the law of trusts for
long. Courts soon found other relationships that shared many of the
attributes of the trustee-beneficiary relationship. Reasoning by analogy,
courts have applied fiduciary duties to agents,33 attorneys, 3 executors
and personal representatives, 35 corporate officers and directors,36
partners,37 majority shareholders in close corporations,38 public officials,39
union officers,4 and pension fund managers.41 In order to gain a better
understanding of fiduciary law, the remainder of this section first looks
at what distinguishes fiduciary relationships from other relationships,
and then explores the kinds of duties that fiduciary relationships impose
on the parties.
At its core, a fiduciary relationship is a relationship where one person,
the fiduciary, is under a duty to act for the benefit of another, the
beneficiary.4 2 The foundation of the relationship is the beneficiary's

fiduciaries, and that use was first enforced by ecclesiastical courts); Deborah A. DeMott,
Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of FiduciaryObligation, 1988 Duke L.J. 879, 880 (1988)
(noting that equity would grant relief where common law courts would not). This
history also explains why trusts are usually described as creating a legal interest in the

trustee, which was enforceable at law, and an equitable interest in the beneficiary, which
was enforceable at equity.
33. See, e.g., SHV Coal, Inc. v. Continental Grain Co., 545 A.2d 917, 921 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1988).
34. See, e.g., Doe v. Roe, 681 N.E.2d 640, 645 (11. App. Ct. 1997).
35. See, e.g., Hartlove v. Maryland Sch. for the Blind, 681 A.2d 584, 593 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1996).
36. See, e.g., Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910,912 (N.Y. 1969).
37. See, e.g., Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
38. See, e.g., Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36,42 (3d Cir. 1947).
39. See I. C. SHEPHERD, THE LAW OF FIDUCIARIES 32 (1981) (arguing that some
public officials are fiduciaries because they are obliged to act for public's benefit, and
citing case support).
40. See id. at 34 (citing Gabauer v. Woodcock, 594 F.2d 662, 672 (8th Cir. 1979));
see also Frankel, supra note 32, at 796 (citing Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R. Co., 323
U.S. 192 (1944)).
41. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1994) (defining an ERISA fiduciary as anyone
with discretionary authority or control over an employee pension plan); Varity Corp. v.
Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 496 (1996) (noting that the common law of trusts governed the
management of pension plans before ERISA).
42. See 36A C.J.S. Fiduciary § 3, at 381 (1961); RODWIN, supra note 26, at 181
(defining fiduciary as one who has a legal obligation to serve others). Note that some
commentators use the term "entrustor" or "fiducie" to refer generically to the person to
whom a fiduciary owes a duty. See RODWiN, supra note 26, at 181 (coining term
"fiducie"); Frankel, supra note 32, at 800 n.17 (coining term "entrustor"). This article
will use the term "beneficiary."

well-reposed trust and confidence in the fiduciary's integrity and
fidelity.43 Fiduciaries are expected to keep this trust by serving their
beneficiaries loyally and in good faith. A fiduciary relationship is thus
much more one-sided than the usual relationship between parties

contracting at arms-length. In effect, when a court holds that a particular
relationship is a fiduciary one, the court is saying that for reasons of
policy or justice the relationship should not be governed solely by the
morals of the marketplace."
Inequality, dependence, and reliance are also classic characteristics of
fiduciary relationships.45
The inequality usually stems from the
fiduciary's superior skills, intelligence, or knowledge. 46 However, the

inequality can also stem from a mental or physical weakness on the
beneficiary's part.4 ' Because of this inequality, beneficiaries are
dependent on fiduciaries and must rely on the integrity of the fiduciary's
judgment, actions, and advice.

Once a court determines that a relationship is a fiduciary one, it will
compel the fiduciary to act accordingly. The fiduciary's duty is the
highest standard of duty implied by law.48 Probably because of its

beginnings in equitable and ecclesiastical courts, fiduciary law has
always been heavily imbued with notions of morality and justice.4
According to one commentator, the goal of fiduciary law is nothing less
than to raise the "morality of the marketplace."50 Once someone
becomes a fiduciary, fiduciary law "places him in the role of a moral
person and pressures him to behave in a selfless fashion."5
It is common to divide fiduciary duties into two classes: the duty of
43.

See 36A C.J.S. Fiduciary§3, at381 (1961).

44. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (requiring that a
fiduciary be held to something stricter than the morals of the marketplace).
45. See Frankel, supra note 32, at 800 (noting that a beneficiary is dependent on,
and must rely on, the fiduciary).
46. See 36A C.J.S. Fiduciary § 3, at 384 n.44 (1961) ("Fiduciary relations exist
when parties to a transaction do not meet on equality, one party having a full knowledge
and the other not, and the latter places confidence in the former.").
47. See id. at 387 n.57 ("[T]here must exist a certain inequality, dependence,
weakness of age, of mental strength, business intelligence, knowledge of the facts
involved, or other conditions giving to one advantages over the other." (quoting Yuster
v. Keefe, 90 N.E. 920, 922 (Ind.App. 1910))).
48. See D.A.B. v. Brown, 570 N.W.2d 168, 172 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (citations
ommitted); FDIC v. Stahl, 854 F. Supp. 1565, 1572 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (citations
ommitted); Miller v. Keystone Ins. Co., 636 A.2d 1109, 1116 (Pa. 1994) (Cappy, J.,
dissenting); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 625 (6th ed. 1990).
49. See Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its
Economic Characterand Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1045, 1073 (1991)
(noting that cases use language of "moral censure"); SHEPHERD, supra note 39, at 60
(noting that fiduciary theory is a moral one).
50. Weinrib, supranote 28, at 3.
51. Frankel, supra note 32, at 830.
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loyalty and the duty of care. 2 Most commentators agree, however, that
it is the duty of loyalty that distinguishes fiduciary duties from other
legal duties.53 A fiduciary owes his beneficiary a duty of "the finest
loyalty. ' 4 In the words of Benjamin Cardozo:
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at

arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A [fiduciary] is
held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty
alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of
behavior... Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity
when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty.... Only thus has
the level of cgpnduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden
by the crowd.

Self-interest is antithetical to fiduciary relationships. 6 The biblical
quote at the beginning of this section-that no man can serve two
masters-is often used by courts to describe the fiduciary's duty of
undivided loyalty to his beneficiary.57 It is sometimes said that a
fiduciary may not even enter a situation where a conflict of interest
could arise.58 However, it is probably more accurate to say that, when
faced with a conflict between duty and self-interest, the fiduciary must
act according to the duty.59 At the very least, the fiduciary must disclose
the conflict.
While most jurisdictions recognize a cause of action for breach of
52. See Tamar Frankel, FiduciaryDuties as Default Rules, 74 OR. L. REV. 1209,
1210 (1995); SHEPHERD, supra note 39, at 47.
53. See SHEPHERD, supra note 39, at 48-49 (calling duty of loyalty the essence of a
fiduciary relationship, opining that duty of loyalty and fiduciary relationship are really
one and the same, and arguing that duty of care is best governed by contract or tort law
rather than fiduciary law); Cooter & Freedman, supra note 49, at 1074 (stating that the
duty of loyalty is considered by some commentators as the essence of a fiduciary
relationship).
54. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
55. Id.
56. See Frankel, supra note 32, at 830 (contrasting the fiduciary duty of loyalty
with situations between contracting parties, where self-interest is the norm).
57. See United States v. Mett, 65 F.3d 1531, 1538 (9th Cir. 1995); Chapman v.
Klemick, 3 F.3d 1508, 1512 (1lth Cir. 1993); In re Estate of Shano, 869 P.2d 1203, 1209
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1993); Flatt v. Superior Court, 885 P.2d 950, 956 (Cal. 1994); SHV Coal,
Inc. v. Continental Grain Co., 545 A.2d 917, 921 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
58. See 76 AM. JuR. 2D Trusts § 380, at 375 (1992) (asserting that a fiduciary
cannot enter into situations where his interests conflict with beneficiary's interests); 36A
C.J.S. Fiduciary § 3, at 388 (1961) (stating that it is against public policy to let
fiduciaries be placed in a position where selfish motives could lead them to betray the
trust of a beneficiary).
59. See SHEPHERD, supra note 39, at 149.

fiduciary duty, the elements of this cause of action and the damages
recoverable vary widely. In a majority of jurisdictions, the elements of
breach of fiduciary duty are duty, breach, causation, and damages.60

Some jurisdictions add a fifth element: lack of another recognized tort
that encompasses the facts alleged.6' In some jurisdictions, however,
breach of fiduciary duty has just two elements: duty and breach. Courts

in these jurisdictions hold that damages are not necessary because
fiduciary duties are seen as prophylactic rules designed to protect

beneficiaries by preventing wrongs before they happen.62 These courts

believe that even an unharmed plaintiff has a higher claim than the
defendant to the proceeds derived from a breach of fiduciary duty.63

In light of fiduciary law's protective function, many courts have also
created special rules to help plaintiffs in these cases. These special rules
recognize the fact that the "law watches with the greatest jealousy
transactions and dealings between persons occupying a fiduciary
relationship." 64 For example, courts often reverse the normal rule that
the plaintiff has the burden of proof in a civil case and hold that, once
the plaintiff has shown that a fiduciary relationship exists, the defendant

has the burden of disproving its breach.65 Many courts also hold that the

60. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Great Lakes Turnings, Ltd., 774 F.
Supp. 485, 489-90 (N.D. 111. 1991); Stanley v. Richmond, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 768, 776 (Ct.
App. 1995); FDIC v. Refco Group, Ltd., 989 F. Supp. 1052, 1080 (D. Colo. 1997).
61. See Klemme v. Best, 941 S.W.2d 493, 496 (Mo. 1997) (holding that if an
alleged breach can be characterized as either negligence or breach of fiduciary duty, then
the sole claim is negligence).
62. See Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy v. Boon, 13 F.3d 537, 543 (2d Cir.
1994) (noting breaches of fiduciary duty "comprise a special breed of cases that often
loosen normally stringent requirements of causation and damages"); Zackiva
Communications Corp. v. Horowitz, 826 F. Supp. 86, 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (noting that it
is "well established" that plaintiffs in breach of fiduciary duty cases need not allege
damages); Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912 (N.Y. 1969) (noting that the
absence of an "allegation of damages ... has never been considered to be an essential
requirement for a cause of action founded on a breach of fiduciary duty").
63. See Diamond, 248 N.E.2d at 912; see also Rice v. Perl, 320 N.W.2d 407, 411
(Minn. 1982) (noting that "law has traditionally been unyielding in its assessment of
penalties when a fiduciary... has breached any of his obligations," and upholding the
forfeiture of compensation where an attorney breached the fiduciary duty to a client even
though the client could not prove actual injury).
64. Henricks v. James, 421 So. 2d 1031, 1042 (Miss. 1982).
65. See Knaebel v. Heiner, 663 P.2d 551, 553 (Alaska 1983) (holding existence of
fiduciary duty justifies shifting the burden of proof to defendant); Smith v. TeleCommunication, Inc., 184 Cal. Rptr. 571, 575 (Ct. App. 1982) (stating that where breach
of fiduciary duty is alleged, the fiduciary has the burden of justifying his conduct);

Konover Dev. Corp. v. Zeller, 635 A.2d 798, 810 (Conn. 1994) (holding proof of a
fiduciary relationship imposes a double burden on the fiduciary: the burden of proof
shifts to the fiduciary, and the standard of proof is clear and convincing evidence rather
than preponderance of evidence); Labovitz v. Dolan, 545 N.E.2d 304, 311 (111. App. Ct.
1989) (noting that the fiduciary has the burden of proving by clear and convincing
evidence that the transaction with the beneficiary is just and equitable and that all doubts
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existence of a fiduciary relationship gives rise to a presumption of fraud

or undue influence that can only be rebutted by clear and convincing
evidence.0 Finally, because of fiduciary law's origins, equitable
remedies are available in breach of fiduciary duty cases."
II.

THE PHYSICIAN AS FIDUCIARY

The foundation of the patient-physician relationship is the
trust that physicians are dedicated first and foremost to
serving the needs of their patients.
-Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs,6
American Medical Association 3
Numerous courts have recognized that physicians have most of the
are resolved against the fiduciary); Sampson v. Hunt, 665 P.2d 743, 754 (Kan. 1983)
(holding that "[w]here the fairness of a fiduciary transaction is challenged, the burden of
proof is upon the fiduciary to prove by clear and satisfactory evidence that such
transaction was fair"); Gaynier v. Ginsberg, 715 S.W.2d 749, 754 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986)
(holding that where the plaintiff establishes the existence of a fiduciary relationship, the
burden of proof shifts to the defendant to prove that the transactions with plaintiff were
fair); Wilkins v. Lasater, 733 P.2d 221, 228 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that the
burden of proof is on the fiduciary to show no breach of loyalty was committed, and
noting that all doubts will be resolved against the fiduciary).
66. See Barbara A. v. John G., 193 Cal. Rptr. 422, 432 (Ct. App. 1983) (holding
that the existence of a fiduciary creates the presumption of undue influence); In re Estate
of DeJarnette, 677 N.E.2d 1024, 1029 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (holding that the presumption
of fraud or undue influence arises whenever the fiduciary benefits by virtue of his
fiduciary status); W & W Equip. Co. v. Mink, 568 N.E.2d 564, 573 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991)
(holding that the law presumes fraud whenever the fiduciary attempts to benefit from a
transaction with the beneficiary); Henricks, 421 So.2d at 1042-43 (holding presumption
of undue influence arises where a fiduciary receives substantial benefit from dealing with
a beneficiary); Crawford v. Mindel, 469 A.2d 454, 458 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984)
(holding that although plaintiff usually has burden of proving fraud, fraud may be
presumed where a fiduciary relationship exists).
67. See David Welsh Co. v. Erskine & Tulley, 250 Cal. Rptr. 339, 344 (Ct. App.

1988) (holding equitable relief appropriate in breach of fiduciary duty case); Rice, 320
N.W.2d at 411 (attorney who breaches fiduciary duty to client forfeits right to
compensation); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 cmt. b (1979) (noting that
plaintiff in breach of fiduciary duty cases may elect either compensatory damages or
restitutionary recovery).
68. Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Am. Med. Ass'n, Ethical Issues in
Managed Care, 273 JAMA 330, 331 (1995) [hereinafter AMA, Ethical Issues in
Managed Care]

classic hallmarks of fiduciaries, and have characterized the relationship

between a physician and a patient as a fiduciary relationship.69 The

physician-patient relationship is based on a trust that transcends arms-

length transactions. 0 The patient trusts that the physician is devoted to
the patient's best interests. 1 It is this trust that allows the patient to
place her health and life in the physician's hands and to communicate

openly with the physician about intimate bodily details. 72 Without this
trust and the open communication that it fosters, the patient's diagnosis
and treatment can be jeopardized.'3

The physician-patient relationship is also an unequal relationship that
is characterized by dependence and reliance. Physicians possess
inherent power over their patients because of their superior medical
knowledge. As described by one court:
[Platients are generally persons unlearned in the medical sciences and... courts
may safely assume the knowledge of patient and physician are not in parity....
[T]he patient, being unlearned in [the] medical sciences, has an abject
dependence upon and trust in his physiian for the information upon which he
relies during the decisional process....

The inequality in the physician-patient relationship also stems from
patients' inherent weaknesses. Patients rely on physicians at particularly
69. See, e.g., United States v. Neufeld, 908 F. Supp. 491, 500 (S.D. Ohio 1995);
Hales v. Pittman, 576 P.2d 493, 497 (Ariz. 1978); Stafford v. Shultz, 270 P.2d 1, 1 (Cal.
1954); Simmons v. University of Chicago Hosps. and Clinics, 642 N.E.2d 107, 111 (111.
1994); Henkin, Inc. v. Berea Bank & Trust Co., 566 S.W.2d 420, 423 (Ky. Ct. App.
1978); Warsofsky v. Sherman, 93 N.E.2d 612, 615 (Mass. 1950); Henricks, 421 So. 2d at
1041; Brandt v. Medical Defense Assocs., 856 S.W.2d 667, 670 (Mo. 1993); Stigliano v.
Connaught Lab., Inc., 658 A.2d 715, 720 (N.J. 1995); Demers v. Gerety, 515 P.2d 645,
649 (N.M. Ct. App. 1973); Carson v. Fine, 867 P.2d 610, 611 (Wash. 1994). But see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, § 2 cmt. b (1959) (noting that "although the
relationship between two persons is not a fiduciary relation, it may, nevertheless, be a
confidential relation," and giving as an example the physician-patient relationship).
70. See Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 9 (Cal. 1972) (stating that a physician's
obligation to patients transcends arms-length transactions); Brandt, 856 S.W.2d at 670
(recognizing that a physician occupies a position of trust); Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 797 (N.D. Ohio 1965) (noting that the relationship between
physician and patient is one of trust and confidence).
71. See Petrillo v. Syntex Labs., Inc., 499 N.E.2d 952, 961 (1. App. Ct. 1986)

(holding that the patient is entitled to trust that a physician will protect the sanctity of the
physician-patient relationship and act in the patient's best interests).
72. See Hamnonds, 243 F. Supp. at 801 (noting the necessity that patients be
totally frank with physicians, even if that means disclosing embarrassing information);
Wenninger v. Muesing, 240 N.W.2d 333, 337 (Minn. 1976) (noting that trust between
doctors and patients is essential to successful treatment); Berry v. Moench, 331 P.2d 814,
817 (Utah 1958) (noting that the physician-patient privilege is grounded on a notion that
patients should be encouraged to disclose even embarrassing and intimate details that
might have a bearing on diagnosis and treatment).
73. See Hammonds, 243 F. Supp. at 801 (noting that candor is necessary to the
effective pursuit of health).
74. Cobbs, 502 P.2d at 9.
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vulnerable times; they are usually sick, physically weak, worried about
how their sickness will effect their lives, and scared about their
prognosis. 7 Patients are thus forced to depend on physicians at a time
6
when their health-sometimes even their life-hangs in the balance.
The rise of managed care has affected the balance of power in the

physician-patient relationship in another way. Primary care physicians
who serve as gatekeepers control their patients' access to the entire
health care system. Primary care physicians must authorize diagnostic
tests, referrals to specialists, and hospital admissions. In today's

managed care environment, the physician's control over the patient is
almost total.
Medical codes of ethics also emphasize the physician's fiduciary
status. ' Professional ethics demand that a physician's first duty is to her
patients7 and that physicians must act as patient advocates. 79 Physicians
are expected to place their patients' interests above all others and to
avoid personal conflicts of interests that might jeopardize this loyalty.80
Physicians cannot profit at their patients' expense, except to the extent of
fees generated by medical services actually rendered."1
Finally,
75. See Orentlicher, supra note 20, at 147.
76. See id.
77. Some codes do more than emphasize the physician's fiduciary status; some
explicitly state that a physician is a fiduciary. See, e.g., AM. MED. Ass'N, REPORT OF
THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, REPORT A (1-86): CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST 2 (1986), quoted in Marc A. Rodwin, Strains in the Fiduciary Metaphor:

Divided PhysicianLoyalties and Obligationsin a Changing Health CareSystem, 21 AM.
J.L. & MED. 241,246 (1995) [hereinafter Rodwin, Strains in the FiduciaryMetaphor].
78. See AMA, EthicalIssues in Managed Care, supra note 68, at 334; World Med.
Ass'n Declaration of Geneva Adopted by the General Assembly of The World Med.
Ass'n at Geneva, Switzerland, September 1948 (declaring that a doctor's first
consideration must be the health of patients, and that a doctor owes patients complete
loyalty), quoted in RODWIN, supranote 26, at 268-69.
79. See AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHIcS (1957),
quoted in RODWIN, supra note 26, at 270. The physician's role as "patient advocate" is
interesting in light of the fact that the fiduciary nature of the attorney-client relationship
is so well established.
80. See Rodwin, Strains in the Fiduciary Metaphor, supra note 77, at 246-47
(summarizing ethical opinions from the American Medical Association, the American
College of Physicians, and the American College of Surgeons).
81. See AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS (1957),
quoted in RODWIN, supra note 26, at 270. Interestingly, as one commentator has pointed
out, this ethical canon would seem to prohibit all managed care financial incentives. See
Geist, supra note 21, at 1306. This ethical canon has also found expression in numerous
laws which prohibit fee splitting. Fee splitting refers to the practice of paying or
charging a fee for patient referrals. For example, a diagnostic laboratory might agree to

pay a physician $15 for every patient the physician refers to the lab for x-rays. Fee

physicians must keep patient information confidential.8 2
Professional norms also reinforce the fiduciary nature of the
physician-patient relationship. In the eyes of the medical community,
the ideal physician-patient relationship is based on trust.83 The very
concept of a profession' implies many of the hallmarks of a fiduciary
relationship, including service to others s5 and superior knowledge.86
Indeed, some commentators view professionals as striking a bargain
with society in which they promise to serve their clients loyally,
competently, and with integrity in exchange for high status, freedom
from competition, and self-regulation. 7
With the rise of managed care in general, and the widespread use of
financial incentives in particular, many argue that the fiduciary nature of
the physician-patient relationship is being eroded.88 While proponents of
splitting is problematic for two reasons. First, fee splitting can increase health care costs
if the provider who pays the referral fee passes that cost on to the patient or the insurer.
Second, fee splitting can lead to the provision of unnecessary treatment if physicians are
tempted to make referrals in order to earn the referral fee. Fee splitting is prohibited by

numerous state and federal laws. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1320(a)-7b(b) (1994)
(prohibiting anyone from receiving or paying any remuneration in exchange for referring
Medicare or Medicaid patients to other providers); ALA. CODE § 34-24-360(10) (1997)
(listing fee splitting as grounds for revoking physician's license); CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 650 (Deering 1998) (prohibiting fee splitting); IDAHO CODE § 54-1814(8) (1998)
(listing fee splitting as grounds for professional discipline); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-148(3)
(1996) (same); R.I. GEN. LAWs § 5-37-5.1(12) (1995) (same).
82. See AMERICAN MEDICAL AsSOCIATION PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS (1957),
quoted in RODwIN, supra note 26, at 270; Hippocratic Oath, quoted in RODwIN, supra
note 26, at 268.
83. See Ezekial J. Emanuel & Nancy Neveloff Dubler, Preserving the PhysicianPatient Relationship in the Era of Managed Care, 273 JAMA 323, 323-25 (1995)
(noting further that "trust" is a composed of six factors: choice, competence,
communication, compassion, continuity and the absence of a conflict of interest).
84. Although definitions vary, many agree that professions are high-status,
knowledge-based occupations characterized by specialized knowledge, autonomy,
authority over others, and altruism. See RANDY HODSON & TERESA A. SULLIVAN, THE
SOCIAL ORGANIZAION OF WORK 287-94 (1990). Medicine is one of the classic
professions, along with law and divinity. See id; see also ELIOT FREIDSON,
PROFESSIONAL POWERS 21-22 (1986).
85. See HODSON & SULLIVAN, supra note 84, at 293-94 (discussing professionals'
altruism and service to others); see generally Geoff Mungham & Philip A. Thomas,
Solicitors and Clients: Altruism or Self-Interest?, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE PROFESSIONS
131 (Robert Dingwall & Philip Lewis eds., 1983) (noting that solicitors must put their
clients' interests over self-interest and act according to principles of altruism).
86. See HODSON & SULLIVAN, supra note 84, at 288-90 (noting true professions
are characterized by esoteric knowledge that is important to the well-being of society);
Steven Brint, Eliot Freidson'sContribution to the Sociology of Professions, 20 WORK
AND OCCUPATONs 266 (1993) (stating a major source of professional power are
knowledge monopolies, which give professionals the ability to control how their work is
accomplished and to control others' access to certain resources).
87. See Dietrich Rueschemeyer, ProfessionalAutonomy and the Social Control of
Expertise, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE PROFESSIONS, supra note 85, at 38, 41.
88. See, e.g., AMA, EthicalIssues in Managed Care, supra note 68, at 333 (noting
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managed care can argue that financial incentives are necessary in order
to curb the rising costs associated with fee-for-service medicine,
opponents may argue that they threaten the physician's duty of loyalty
by forcing the physician to consider personal financial interests when
caring for patients. Opponents may also fear that these financial
incentives will lead physicians to undertreat patients and deny medically
necessary care.
Traditional malpractice law supplies a partial response to such fears.
If a physician denies care which is medically necessary, the patient can
file a malpractice suit. In the Jane Doe hypothetical, for example, Doe's
husband could try to allege that the failure to perform additional tests or
to refer his wife to a specialist fell below the appropriate standard of

care. In many instances, however, malpractice law is an inadequate
remedy. As one commentator has noted:
There is a grey area in medicine and tort law that emerges in situations where it
is medically reasonable and defensible to... [withhold] care for a patient's
condition.... Withholding care from patients in the grey area is likely to cause
injury to some individuals. These are patients who in fact do need treatment
even though they do not display enough symptoms to make the need for care
readily apparent. Physicians who have no considerations other than the
patient's health will likely treat these patients as a matter of caution. Physicians
influenced by cost control procedures will elect not to treat them. Since it is not
malprqctice to withhold care, tort law is not a deterrent to the injuries that will
result.
Assume that Jane Doe's physician can prove that the failure to

perform additional tests did not violate the appropriate standard of care

because colon cancer is rare in young adults with no family history of
the disease and because Doe's symptoms did not indicate colon cancer. 0
that financial incentives to limit care may compromise a physician's duty to patients);
Emanuel & Dubler, supranote 83, at 326 (noting managed care poses threats to the ideal
physician-patient relationship).
89. Edward B. Hirslfeld, Should Third Party Payors of Health Care Services
Disclose Cost Control Mechanisms to PotentialBeneficiaries?, 14 SETON HALL LEGIs. J.
115, 139 (1990); see also DAVIS ET AL., supranote 3, at 203 (noting the inevitability that
in any system which encourages physicians and hospitals to provide fewer services,
some reductions in services will have little adverse effect on-and may even enhancequality, while other reductions will result in a decrease in quality). Davis states that
"[g]iven the fiscal incentives confronting HMOs, one would expect isolated instances of
underprovision of care by HMOs even if HMOs as a whole provide high-quality care."
Id. at 216.
90. In the real case, Jane Doe's physicians alleged that she was "vague" in
discussing her symptoms during her first visit. See Olmos, supra note 1, at Al. She
stressed pelvic and abdominal pain, which is not a symptom of colon cancer, rather than

Malpractice law might leave Doe without a remedy, even though

additional tests could have diagnosed her cancer much earlier, even
though her physician would probably have ordered additional tests in the
absence of financial incentives, and even though Doe would have been

willing to pay for the tests herself. Malpractice law thus provides only a
partial response to fears that financial incentives will lead to adverse

outcomes.
Some commentators have suggested that the doctrine of informed

consent provides another response to financial incentives.9 The doctrine
of informed consent is based on each person's right to control what

happens to her body. 92 Because of this right, physicians have a duty to
obtain their patients' informed consent to medical treatment.93 In order

for consent to be informed, physicians must give their patients
information about their diagnosis and the risks of, and alternatives to, the
recommended treatmentY4
Failure to disclose this information
constitutes malpractice. 95 If an undisclosed risk actually materializes and
harms the patient, the physician is liable.96 Although such a claim has
not yet been successful, a patient could argue that the existence of
managed care financial incentives is one of the risks that a physician
must disclose in order to obtain a patient's informed consent to medical

treatment.
The problem with relying on informed consent is that a majority of
courts measure the scope of the physician's duty to disclose against a
professional standard. In these jurisdictions, physicians are only
required to disclose risks that a reasonable medical practitioner would
rectal bleeding, which is. See id.
91. See Deven C. McGraw, Financial Incentives to Limit Services: Should
Physicians be Required to Disclose These to Patients?, 83 GEo. L.J. 1821, 184047

(1995) (arguing informed consent could be used to compel physicians to disclose
financial incentives).

92, See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
93. See id. at 780-81.
94. See id. Note that the recommended treatment could also include a decision not
to treat.
95. See Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 8 (Cal. 1972). When a physician performs a
procedure which a patient has not consented to at all, the physician is liable for battery.
See id.; Canterbury,464 F.2d at 783.
96. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 790. Because it is a type of malpractice, a
plaintiff in an informed consent case must prove both causation and damages. In order
to prove causation, the plaintiff must show (1) that an undisclosed risk occurred, and (2)
that a reasonable patient would not have consented to the treatment if they had been
informed of the risk. See id.; Gracia v. Meiselman, 531 A.2d 1373, 1374 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1987). Most courts have adopted an objective reasonable patient standard
because of fears of self-serving testimony. See Cobbs, 502 P.2d at 11 (noting that
because the undisclosed risk materialized at the time of trial, "it would be surprising if
the [patient] did not claim that had he been informed of the dangers he would have
declined treatment").
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disclose in similar circumstances.97

Since few, if any, physicians

currently disclose financial incentives, informed consent will not be a
helpful tool for dealing with financial incentives in a majority of
jurisdictions. A minority of courts have rejected a professional standard
in favor of a patient-based standard." These courts require physicians to
disclose all risks that a reasonable patient would find material in
deciding whether to consent to treatment.
In these jurisdictions, it
would be possible to argue that physicians must disclose financial
incentives; most patients would find them material because of their
potential to cloud a physician's judgment.
However, even in
jurisdictions that have adopted a patient-based standard of disclosure, it
is unclear whether courts will extend the concept of treatment risks to
include financial incentives.1°0
Even if a traditional malpractice claim or an informed consent claim
were available, there are still several reasons why a plaintiff might prefer
to bring a different cause of action, like breach of fiduciary duty. First,
evidence of financial incentives will likely influence the jury's
deliberations and make it easier for a plaintiff to win punitive
damages. ' ' It is simply more powerful to argue that withholding
97. See, e.g., Ritz v. Florida Patient's Compensation Fund, 436 So. 2d 987, 990
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Jones v. Malloy, 412 N.W.2d 837, 842 (Neb. 1987).
98. See, e.g., Canterbury,464 F.2d at 786 (holding that "a professional standard is
at odds with the patient's prerogative to decide on projected therapy himself').
99. See Canterbury,464 F.2d at 786-88; Truman v. Thomas, 611 P.2d 902, 905
(Cal. 1980); Cobbs, 502 P.2d at 11.
100. But see Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990)
(holding that the patient could bring an informed consent claim against a physician for
failure to disclose research or economic interests in patient's treatment that could affect
physician's professional judgment). Given the Moore court's holding, it is entirely
possible that, in California at least, a patient could state an informed consent claim
against a physician for failing to disclose managed care financial incentives. It is
unclear, however, whether other courts will follow Moore. The Moore court held that
the failure to disclose research or economic interests in the patient's treatment could also
give rise to a claim for breach of fiduciary duty; the decision is thus discussed in greater
detail in Part III of this paper.
101. See, e.g., Christine Woolsey, Jury Hits HMO for Coverage Denial, Bus. INS.,
Jan. 3, 1994, at 1 (quoting lawyer who successfully sued HMO for breach of contract and
breach of duty of good faith as stating that the jury, which awarded $77 million in
punitive damages, was astonished to learn of financial incentives); Elias, Doctors
Negligent in Woman's Cancer Death, supra note 1, at A3 (quoting defense attorney as
saying that the jury was unduly influenced by plaintiff s attorney's argument that
physicians delayed in sending the woman to a specialist because they feared doing so

would cut into their profits; jury returned $3 million verdict against physician);

CaliforniaJury Awards $3 Million to Family of Deceased Cancer Patient,supra note 1

969

treatment was motivated by greed rather than by a failure to "use the

care and skill ordinarily exercised in like cases by reputable members of

the profession."' 2 However, in a malpractice case, where the focus is on
whether the physician met the applicable standard of care, the court

might exclude evidence of financial incentives as either irrelevant or
overly prejudicial." 3 If she can get around this evidentiary barrier, the
plaintiff might also want the court to instruct the jury on the fiduciary
nature of the physician-patient relationship and the physician's duty of

loyalty. But courts rarely give fiduciary instructions in malpractice

cases. 4 A plaintiff might also prefer a different cause of action in order
to get around the limits on damages that many states have imposed on

malpractice suits.' 5 Finally, a plaintiff might want to take advantage of
the availability of equitable remedies or of the shifting burdens of proof
and special presumptions that courts have created in breach of fiduciary
duty cases. Thus, even where a malpractice claim is available, a plaintiff
might prefer to file a breach of fiduciary duty claim instead. Part I
discusses the only two published opinions that have addressed the issue

of whether a plaintiff may do so.

(noting plaintiff's lawyer presented evidence that capitation allowed doctors to profit by
not sending patients to specialists). Note that punitive damages are rarely available in
malpractice cases. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW § 6-7, at 261 (1995).
102. CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCIONS-CIvIL: BOOK OF APPROVED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS § 6.00.1 (Paul G. Breckenridge, Jr. ed., 8th ed. 1994 & Supp. 1998)
(setting forth California's standard medical malpractice jury instruction).

103. See Madsen v. Park Nicollet Med. Ctr., 419 N.W.2d 511, 515 (Minn. Ct. App.
1988), rev'd on other grounds, 431 N.W.2d 855 (Minn. 1988) (holding that the trial

court did not abuse discretion in excluding evidence of financial incentives because such
evidence is only "marginally relevant, and potentially very prejudicial").
104. But see Demers v. Gerety, 515 P.2d 645, 650 (N.M. Ct. App. 1973) (approving
instruction on physician's fiduciary duty in malpractice case), rev'd on other grounds,
589 P.2d 180 (N.M. 1978).
105. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE. § 3333.2 (Deering 1984) (limiting noneconomic
losses in medical malpractice suits to $250,000); IND. CODE ANN. § 27-12-14-3 (Michie
1994) (limiting malpractice awards to $750,000); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (Michie
1992) (limiting malpractice awards to $1 million); see also FURRow ET AL., supra note 2,
at 392-95 (discussing other statutory reforms to malpractice law, including shortened
statutes of limitations, alterations in plaintiffs' burden of proof, and requirements that
malpractice cases be pre-screened before proceeding to trial).

PatientAdvocates

[VoL. 35: 951, 1998]

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

rH.

SUITS AGAINST PHYSICIANS FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY

Certainly a sick patient deserves to be free of any
reasonablesuspicion that his doctor's judgment is influenced
by a profit motive.
-California

Court of Appeal ' o

As noted in Part II, numerous courts have held that physicians have
fiduciary duties to their patients. But with two exceptions, none of these
cases has involved an actual breach of fiduciary duty claim. Most of
these cases have dealt with the physician's duty of disclosure or
confidentiality and have involved informed consent,""' the medical
malpractice statute of limitations,'5 or the physician-patient privilege."°
106. Magan Med. Clinic v. California State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 57 Cal. Rptr. 256,
262 (Ct. App. 1967). Magan involved a challenge to the constitutionality of a California
law prohibiting physicians from owning interests in pharmacies. Id. at 256. The court
upheld the law under deferential review, noting that the Legislature had reason to believe
that a "doctor who has a financial interest in where his prescriptions are filled may be
tempted to prescribe unnecessary medicine, or to prescribe a drug which yields a greater
margin of profit or to keep a patient on drugs for an unnecessary period of time." Id. at
262.
107. See Nelson v. Gaunt, 178 Cal. Rptr. 167, 173 (Ct. App. 1981) (noting that
informed consent theory is based on a physician's fiduciary duty of disclosure); Gates v.
Jensen, 595 P.2d 919, 922 (Wash. 1979) (same).
108. The statute of limitations in a medical malpractice case generally begins to run
when the plaintiff actually discovers an injury, or should have discovered it by using
reasonable diligence. See Stafford v. Shultz, 270 P.2d 1, 7 (Cal. 1954). However, the
statute will be tolled where the patient's failure to discover the injury is caused by the
physician's failure to disclose facts that would enable the patient to do so. See id. at 8. It
is the fiduciary relationship between the patient and the physician that excuses the
patient from exercising greater diligence in ferreting out the existence of injury. See id.;
see also Sanchez v. South Hoover Hosp., 553 P.2d 1129, 1132 (Cal. 1976) (noting that
the tolling rule is based on the fiduciary relationship between doctor and patient, and the

fact that. apart from a doctor's disclosure, a patient has few methods of learning that an
injury was caused by negligence).
109. See Torres v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 270 Cal. Rptr. 401,403-04
(Ct. App. 1990) (holding that although a physician has a fiduciary duty of

confidentiality, physician-patient privilege does not bar the treating physician from

testifying for the defense where the privilege was waived by plaintiff's filing of
malpractice suit); Trujillo v. Puro, 683 P.2d 963, 967-68 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984)
(discussing fiduciary duty of confidentiality in analyzing physician-patient privilege).

Only one case, Moore v. Regents of the University of California,1 has
held that a patient can state a claim against a physician for breach of
fiduciary duty." The only other case to address this issue, D.A.B. v.
Brown," 2 held that if the alleged breach occurred during the doctor's
treatment, examination, diagnosis, or care of the patient, the patient's
only claim was for medical malpractice."' This section discusses both
cases, concludes that Moore is the better reasoned decision, and argues
that it should be followed by other courts.
A.

Moore v. Regents of the University of California

The facts of Moore are unique. John Moore was treated for leukemia
by Dr. David Golde at the UCLA Medical Center. 1 4 The course of
treatment included the removal of Moore's spleen and almost seven
years of follow up therapy and monitoring."' Throughout the treatment,
but unbeknownst to Moore, Golde was conducting research on Moore's
blood cells." 6 Golde's research paid off. He eventually obtained a
patent on a cell line made from Moore's T-lymphocytes and successfully
negotiated agreements for its commercial development.1 7 When Moore
found out about this, he sued Golde for, among other things, breach of
fiduciary duty."'
The gravamen of Moore's complaint was that Golde "failed to
disclose the extent of his research and economic interests in Moore's
cells before obtaining consent to the medical procedures by which the
cells were extracted."" 9 The court agreed and held that "a physician
must disclose personal interests unrelated to the patient's health, whether
research or economic, that may affect the physician's professional
judgment."'20 The court based its holding on the fact that a physician
110. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
Ill. Id. at483.
112. 570 N.W.2d 168 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
113. Id. at 172. Although not directly on point, the Arizona Supreme Court in
Hales v. Pittman refused to recognize a cause of action against a physician for breach of
trust where battery or malpractice actions provided adequate remedies. Hales v. Pittman,
576 P.2d 493, 497 (Ariz. 1978).
114. See Moore, 793 P.2d at 480.
115. See id. at 481. The follow up included withdrawing and performing tests on
Moore's blood, skin, bone marrow, and sperm. See id. Although Moore lived in Seattle,
Washington, Golde insisted that all tests be performed at the UCLA Medical Center. See
id. Moore complied with Golde's directions, and made several trips to Los Angeles. See
id.
116.

See id.

120.

Id.

117. See id. at 482.
118. See id.
119. Id. at483.
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who has a research or economic interest in a patient has "potentially
conflicting loyalties," and that a patient has a right to know about the
to the patient's health" might
possibility that "an interest extraneous
2'
judgment.'
physician's
the
affect
After determining that Moore did indeed have a cause of action, the
court had to characterize it. The court held that Moore's cause of action
could be characterized as either a breach of fiduciary duty or as the
failure to obtain informed consent to medical treatment.'2 Although
informed consent is a widely accepted theory, the Moore court was the
first to recognize a cause of action against a doctor for breach of
fiduciary duty. Perhaps aware that it was treading in uncharted territory,
and also aware of the potential to stretch the fiduciary metaphor too far,
the court made the following cautionary statement:
In some respects the term "fiduciary" is too broad. In this context the term
"fiduciary" signifies only that a physician must disclose all facts material to the
patient's decision. A physician is not the patient's financial adviser.... [T]he
reason why a physician must disclose possible conflicts is not because he has a
duty to protect his patient's financial intgests, but because certain personal
interests may affect professional judgment.

Although the Moore court recognized a new cause of action, it did not
give lower courts any guidance on its contours or how it might differ, if
at all, from an informed consent action. A plaintiff in an informed
consent case must generally allege four elements: a duty to obtain the
patient's informed consent to treatment; breach of that duty due to a
failure to disclose the risks, benefits, and alternatives to the treatment;

causation; and damages. In order to prove causation, the plaintiff must
show that, had the disclosure been made, a reasonable patient would not
have given consent.' 24 The majority opinion in Moore did not specify
how a breach of fiduciary duty claim would compare.
The dissent in Moore appeared to believe that the elements of a breach

121. Id. at 484.
122. See id. at 485.
123. Id. at485 n.10.
124. See Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 11-12 (Cal. 1972). There was no evidence
that Moore would have declined the spleenectomy if he had known of Golde's research,

although he might have picked another doctor to perform it. However, after the surgery,
Golde told Moore he needed periodic monitoring at UCLA, and Moore traveled from his
home in Seattle to Los Angeles in order to allow Golde to conduct the monitoring.
Moore, 793 P.2d at 481. There was thus some evidence that Moore would not have
made the trip if Golde had made the required disclosure.

of fiduciary duty claim would be identical.'2' In a concurring opinion,
however, Justice Broussard suggested that the causation element would

be different. Broussard stated that a plaintiff alleging breach of fiduciary
duty "should not be 'required to establish that he would not have
proceeded with the medical treatment in question... but only that the
doctor's wrongful failure to disclose information proximately caused the
plaintiff some type of compensable damage."' ' Although Broussard did
not elaborate on the causation element or on what types of damages
might be recoverable, he did note that punitive damages would "clearly"
be recoverable.'27
While Moore certainly raises questions about the contours of a breach
of fiduciary duty claim, the decision is a sound one. As discussed in
Part II, numerous courts have recognized that physicians have most of
the classic hallmarks of fiduciaries, and numerous courts have
recognized that physicians have fiduciary duties of disclosure towards
their patients. Although the undisclosed interests in Moore were
research interests," the court's holding could easily be extended to
managed care financial incentives. As the court noted, "the law...
recognizes that a reasonable patient would want to know whether a
physician has an economic interest that might affect the physician's
professional judgment.' '29 Like the research interests in Moore,
managed care financial incentives create economic interests that may
affect a physician's professional judgment. A patient should be able to
state a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty against a physician
who fails to disclose these financial incentives.
B. D.A.B. v. Brown
In contrast to Moore, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held in D.A.B.

v. Brown that a patient could not state a claim against a physician for
breach of fiduciary duty for conduct that related to examination,
diagnosis, treatment, or care.'3° Dr. David Brown was a physician
specializing in pediatric endocrinology."' Over the course of eight
125. See Moore, 793 P.2d at 518-19 (Mosk, dissenting) (referring to breach of
fiduciary duty and informed consent causes of action as, jointly, a nondisclosure cause of
action, and stating that the plaintiff must prove the physician breached the duty to
disclose and that there was a causal connection between injury and failure to disclose).
126. Id. at 500 (emphasis added).
127. Id.
128. Note that although Golde's direct interest in Moore was a research interest, he
also had an indirect financial interest because he stood to gain financially if his research
paid off.
129. Id. at 483.
130. 570 N.W.2d 168, 172 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
131. See id. at 169.

974
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years, he prescribed a drug called Protoprin to more than 200 patients.'32
Protoprin is used to treat growth hormone deficiency in children.'33 In

1994, Brown was indicted for violating the Medicare/Medicaid AntiKickback statute.' 34 This statute prohibits physicians from receiving
remuneration for referring Medicare or Medicaid patients to other health
care providers.' 35 The distributor of the drug was paying Brown to
36
induce him to refer patients for Protoprin-related services and supplies.'
Upon learning of the indictment, six of Brown's patients sued. 31 Their
complaint was based on a breach of fiduciary duty for failing to disclose
the kickback scheme; there was no allegation that the Protoprin
treatment had been inappropriate or that they had been injured by the
drug. 3 The trial court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim, and
the appellate court affirmed.'39
The court started out by noting that lack of informed consent is a
widely recognized cause of action against a doctor who fails to disclose
material facts about treatment.'" The court also acknowledged that the
physician-patient relationship is a fiduciary one.' 4' The court noted that
it is "well accepted that patients deserve medical opinions about
treatment plans and referrals unsullied by conflicting motives.' 42
Finally, the court agreed that patients deserve medical advice that is free
from "self-serving financial considerations."' 43 However, the court
refused to recognize the breach of fiduciary duty claim for failing to
disclose these "self-serving financial considerations"; instead, the court
held that all conduct related to the examination, diagnosis, treatment, or
care of a patient should be governed solely by malpractice law."
132.

See id.

134.

See id. The Anti-Kickback statute is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320(a)-7b(b)

133.

See id.

(1994). It prohibits anyone from soliciting or receiving any remuneration in return for
referring Medicare or Medicaid patients to health care providers or suppliers, or for

purchasing or recommending any service or item for a Medicare or Medicaid patient.
See id.
135. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320(a)-7b(b) (1994).
136. See D.A.B., 570 N.W.2d at 169.
137. See id.
138. See id. at 169, 171.
139. See id. at 173.
140. See id. at 170.
141. See id. at 172.
142. Id. at 170.
143. Id. at 172.
144. Id. at 171.

The court gave only one reason for its decision. The court was
worried that allowing these plaintiffs to bring a breach of fiduciary duty
claim would allow plaintiffs generally to avoid the sometimes heavy
burden of proving malpractice.' 5 For example, there was no allegation

that Brown was negligent in prescribing Protoprin and no allegation of
injury. Both of these elements would have been required in a
malpractice case, but not in a breach of fiduciary duty case.' 46 The
D.A.B. plaintiffs had also missed Minnesota's two-year statute of
limitations for malpractice claims and were hoping to use the longer sixyear statute applicable to general civil claims. 47 Since Brown's failure
to disclose the kickback scheme presented a "classic informed consent"
issue, and since the plaintiffs had not met the requirements of this
malpractice
claim, the court upheld the trial court's dismissal of their
48
suit.
Although the court's hesitancy to allow plaintiffs to avoid statutory
malpractice requirements is understandable, its reasoning is flawed. The
fact that the D.A.B. plaintiffs' case contained many of the elements of an
informed consent claim should not have prevented them from being able
to state a claim based on breach of fiduciary duty. The D.A.B. court
failed to follow precedent on this issue set down by its own supreme
court. In Rice v. Perl, the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized that, in
the context of an attorney-client relationship, a client could have a cause
of action for both malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty.' 49 Cecilia
Rice hired Norman Perl to represent her in a product liability suit against
A.H. Robbins, the manufacturer of the Dalkon Shield, and Aetna
Casualty & Surety, Robbins' insurer.'5 Perl negotiated a settlement with
Willard Browne, an Aetna claims adjuster, and advised Rice to accept
it.' However, Perl failed to disclose the fact that Browne was a good
friend and that Browne had done occasional work for Perl's law firm.'5 2
When Rice discovered this undisclosed relationship, she sued Perl for
malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty.
The trial court dismissed the malpractice claim on summary judgment,
holding that Rice had not sustained her burden of proving that the failure

145. See id.
146. In Minnesota, damages are not an essential element of a breach of fiduciary
duty claim. See id. at 172.
147. See id.
148.
149.

150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at 171-73.
320 N.W.2d 407 (Minn. 1982).

See id. at 408.
See id.
See id. at 409.
See id.
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to disclose caused her any damages." The trial court, however, granted
Rice relief on the breach of fiduciary duty claim, holding that an
attorney who fails to disclose material information to a client is guilty of

breach whether or not damages are alleged. 5 Although Rice could not
prove actual damages, the court held that Perl forfeited his attorney's
fees because of the breach.156 Both sides appealed, and the Minnesota

Supreme Court affirmed.'

Even though Rice was not able to state a

claim for malpractice, she still had a viable breach of fiduciary duty
claim.'58 The D.A.B. court should have followed Rice and allowed the

breach of fiduciary duty claim to go forward even though a malpractice
claim could not.
In addition to its failure to follow precedent, the D.A.B. decision is
flawed for a second reason. Pleading in the alternative is a time-honored
common law tradition, and many courts allow patients to sue their
doctors on several different theories arising out of the same events.
Nelson v. Gaunt,'59 a California Court of Appeal's decision, provides a
good example of pleading in the alternative in a medical malpractice

case. In 1968, Mary Nelson consulted Dr. Frank Gaunt about breast

Gaunt told her about a safe and inexpensive
augmentation. 1"°
procedure-silicone injection-that would be completely free of side
effects. 6' Nelson consented to and had the procedure that day.'6 2 At the
time, however, silicone was considered dangerous by the FDA and was
not approved for non-scientific use. Three months after the injection,
Nelson discovered several lumps in her breast.' She consulted another
154. See id. at 410.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See id. at 413.
158. Presumably, if Rice could have proven actual damages, she would have a
viable claim for both malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty. See also Stanley v.
Richmond, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 768, 776 (Ct. App. 1995) (noting that a professional
negligence claim is different than a breach of fiduciary duty claim, and allowing both
claims to proceed against an attorney); Klemme v. Best, 941 S.W.2d 493, 495-96 (Mo.
1997) (discussing the difference between malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty, and
holding that, where an attorney's failure to disclose material information to a client does
not fall below the professional standard of care, plaintiff can still state a cause of action
for breach of fiduciary duty).
159. 178 Cal. Rptr. 167 (Ct. App. 1981).
160. See id. at 169.
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See id. at 169-70.
164. See id. at 170.

physician who determined that the lumps were being caused by the
silicone.'65 Not only could silicone itself be dangerous, but its presence
made it difficult to detect whether the lumps were cancerous.' Three
years later, her physician discovered a large mass in each breast and
enlarged lymph nodes under her arms. 67 He recommended a double
mastectomy, and Nelson agreed.'6 No malignancy was found, but
Nelson was convinced she would eventually develop cancer.69
Soon after the surgery, Nelson sued Gaunt for malpractice, battery,
fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 70° Gaunt moved
for summary judgment on the grounds that the one-year statute of
limitations for medical malpractice had run. 7' The trial court granted the
motion with respect to the malpractice claim only. 72 The jury found for
Nelson and awarded her $2 million, including $1.5 million in punitive
damages.' Gaunt appealed and the appellate court affirmed.
Gaunt argued that because all of Nelson's claims related to medical

treatment they should all be controlled by the one-year medical
malpractice statute of limitations. 5 The court disagreed, noting that
battery, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotion distress were
separate causes of action and were controlled by the three-year statute of
limitations generally applicable in civil cases. 6 Gaunt had told Nelson
that silicone was safe even though he knew the FDA considered it unsafe
and even though injecting was actually illegal. The court held that
Gaunt had a duty to disclose the true nature of the procedure to Nelson
and that his intentional failure to do so could give rise to a cause of
action for fraud, battery,"r or intentional infliction of emotional
distress. 7 1 The Nelson decision shows that the D.A.B. court's refusal to
allow any cause of action other than malpractice is simply not
persuasive.

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 170-71.
See id. at 171.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 179.
See id. at 171.
See id. at 173-74.

178.

See id. at 174.

177. See id. at 173 (explaining that the procedure which Nelson consented to-a
safe one with no side effects-was so different from the procedure that was actually
performed, that jury could find the procedure performed amounted to battery).
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IV. USING FIDUCIARY LAW TO COMPEL PHYSICIANS TO
DISCLOSE FINANCIAL INCENTIVES

Physicians today are experiencing ethical tensions between
patient advocacy and population-based health care
management.
-William

M. Sage'79

Other courts should follow Moore and allow patients to state a claim
against a physician for breach of fiduciary duty. While the outcomes in
Moore and D.A.B. were different, there is one important similarity
between the two cases that can help define the contours of the fiduciary
duty at issue. Moore and D.A.B. were both disclosure cases. The
plaintiffs filed suit because their physicians had not disclosed the fact
that their treatment recommendations might be influenced by personal
interests. The plaintiffs were not alleging that such personal interests in
and of themselves gave rise to liability. In Moore, for example, the
plaintiff was not arguing that physicians should not be allowed to have

research interests in their patients, just that physicians should be required
to disclose those interests. And in D.A.B., the only claim against the
doctor involved his failure to disclose the kickback arrangement, not the
existence of the arrangement.8
By focusing on nondisclosure and
following the reasoning of Moore, courts should hold that physicians
have a fiduciary duty to disclose managed care financial incentives.
Where a physician has breached the fiduciary duty of disclosure, a
plaintiff should be able to elect either legal or equitable remedies.
Where the failure to disclose causes actual damages to the plaintiff,'8 ' the
plaintiff should be able to recover for those damages. In the Jane Doe
hypothetical, for example, her husband could to try to prove that if his
179.

'Health Law 2000': The Legal System and the Changing Health Care Market,

15 HEALTH AFFAIRS 9, 11 (1996).
180. See D.A.B. v. Brown, 570 N.W.2d 168, 169 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997). Note that
kickback schemes like the one in D.A.B. are prohibited under both Minnesota and
Federal law. See id. at 170.
181. Actual damages in a breach of fiduciary claim would be similar to actual
damages in medical malpractice claim, and would include lost wages, impaired earning
capacity, medical expenses, and pain and suffering. See FuRRoW ETAL., supra note 101,
at 261.

wife had known of the financial incentives she would have pressed her
PCP or HMO harder, sought the advice of another physician, or paid for
additional diagnostic tests on her own and that such actions would have
led to an earlier diagnosis and a better chance of survival.'" If Doe's
husband can prove this, he should be able to recover for all damages
flowing from the delayed diagnosis.'
Since breach of fiduciary duty is an equitable claim, plaintiffs should
also be able to elect equitable remedies like restitution."' Courts have
long held that restitution, particularly through the imposition of a
constructive trust, is an appropriate remedy in breach of fiduciary duty
cases." 5 With restitution, a plaintiff's recovery is measured by the
benefit to the defendant rather than the harm to the plaintiff.86 Because
restitution is based on the principal that "a wrongdoer shall not be
permitted to make a profit from his own wrong,'' some courts have
held that restitution is available even where the plaintiff has suffered no
182. Note that this causation analysis is similar to the analysis that is applied in
informed consent cases. See Gracia v. Meiselman, 531 A.2d 1373, 1374 (N.J. Sup. Ct.
Law Div. 1987) (holding that causation in informed consent cases is established by
showing that the plaintiff would not have consented to treatment if the risk had been
disclosed and the undisclosed risk materialized and harmed the patient).
183. Note that many jurisdictions recognize the loss of chance doctrine, whereby
plaintiff can recover on a showing that the delay in diagnosis reduced their chance of
survival, even where the chance of survival was below 50 percent to begin with. See
FuRROw sr AL., supra note 101, at 262-64 (discussing "loss of a chance" doctrine). In
Herskovitz v. Group Health Cooperative,664 P.2d 474, 474 (Wash. 1983), for example,
recovery was allowed where the physician's delayed diagnosis reduced plaintiffs chance
of recovery from 39 percent to 25 percent. Thus, even if Doe's husband could not prove
that his wife would have survived if her cancer had been diagnosed earlier, he would still

be able to recover for the loss of chance caused by the delay.
184. See Booher v. Frue, 394 S.E.2d 816, 821 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that a
plaintiff in a breach of fiduciary duty case may elect either restitution or damages);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 cmt. b (1979) (noting that plaintiffs in breach
of fiduciary duty cases are entitled to either tort damages or restitutionary recovery); see
generally Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, 67 TEX. L. REv.
1277 (1989) (discussing the election of remedies).
185. See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 515 (1980) (holding that a
constructive trust is a "natural and customary" remedy for breach of fiduciary duty);
App. Ct. 1995) (holding that a
Murges v. Bowman, 655 N.E.2d. 918, 923 (Ill.
constructive trust is an appropriate remedy for a breach of fiduciary duty); Lyall v.
Grayco Builders, Inc., 584 N.Y.S.2d 465, 471 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (same); Meadows
v. Bierschwale, 516 S.W.2d 125, 128 (Tex. 1974) (noting that a breach of a fiduciary
relationship justifies the imposition of a constructive trust); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
TORTS § 874 cmt. b (noting that the ordinary restitutionary remedy is the imposition of a
constructive trust).
186. See Edwards v. Lee's Adm'r, 96 S.W.2d 1028, 1032 (Ky. Ct. App. 1936)
(noting that restitutionary recovery is measured by "profits received, rather than by
damages sustained"); Laycock, supra note 184, at 1287 (noting plaintiff will prefer
restitution where defendant's gain exceeds plaintiff's loss, or where plaintiff's loss is
difficult to prove).
187. Edwards,96 S.W.2d at 1032.
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harm.' 8 Thus, even if a patient cannot prove they were harmed by their
physician's failure to disclose financial incentives, the physician should
not be allowed to keep the profits of her breach. As between the
breaching physician and the innocent patient, the patient has a greater
claim to those profits; a court should thus impose a constructive trust on
the profits in favor of the plaintiff.
Here is one example of how the constructive trust remedy might work
in a class action. Assume that an HMO withholds 20% of its PCPs'
capitation rates and places this money in a risk pool that is used to pay
for diagnostic tests and referrals to specialists. At the end of the year,
whatever is left over in the pool is divided among the physicians. If a
physician fails to disclose this financial incentive, a court would place a
constructive trust on the money the physician received back at the end of
the year. This amount would then be divided among patients based on a

formula that took account of each patient's diagnosis, number of office
visits, and treatment alternatives.'89
Note that such a remedy comes close to imposing strict liability on a
physician for failure to disclose. If the physician does not disclose the
incentive, the physician must turn the fruits of the incentive over to the
patient-period. It is important to point out, however, that this form of
strict liability will not impose unfairly large burdens on physicians who

188. See id. (noting that, in cases where plaintiff suffered no losses or unprovable
losses, law, in seeking adequate remedy, "has been forced to adopt profits received,
rather than damages sustained, as a basis of recovery"); Snepp, 444 U.S. at 507, 515
(imposing constructive trust on ex-CIA agent's book, where agent breached trust by
publishing book without obtaining review by CIA, and noting that trust remedy simply
requires wrongdoer to "disgorge the benefits of his faithlessness"); see also supra notes
62-63 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that damages are not always necessary
in breach of fiduciary duty cases).
189. Note that the constructive trust remedy might be more attractive in class action
cases than in individual cases because the amount available to any one plaintiff would
not be great. In Jane Doe's case, for example, her recovery could conceivably be limited
to the cost of the test that she claims her physicians profit-mindedly failed to order. In a
class action, however, the recovery could be large enough to both deter physicians from
failing to disclose and to attract the attention of plaintiffs' attorneys. A Texas attorney
has recently filed a class action against several Texas HMOs for failing to disclose how
they pay their physicians. See Charles Ornstein, Harris Ready to End Suit; HMO Will
Reveal FinancialIncentives, DALLAS MORNING NEws, Feb. 3, 1998, at 1C. The attorney
is representing a class of over one million patients, and is seeking restitution equal to the
amount that the HMOs paid their physicians as financial incentives over the past six
years. See HarrisMethodist: To Disclose Fee Arrangements, HEALTH. LINE, Feb. 5,
1998. One of the defendants has recently agreed to disclose its physician payment
arrangements in its member handbook. See id.

fail to disclose financial incentives. The most that a physician stands to
lose is that portion of her salary that can be traced to the existence of the
financial incentives. As the United States Supreme Court has said of the
constructive trust remedy in a different context:
[i]t deals fairly with both parties by conforming relief to the dimensions of the
wrong.... [If a fiduciary breaches a duty], the trust remedy simply requires
him to disgorge the benefits of his faithlessness. Since the remedy is swift and
sure, it is tailored to deter those who [would breach a fiduciary duty]. And
since the remedy reaches only funds attributable to the breach, it cannotgaddle
the [fiduciary] with exemplary damages out of all proportion to his gain.

Where a court finds that a physician has breached her fiduciary duty to
disclose financial incentives, the court should use the constructive trust

remedy to compel the physician to turn the fruits of those incentives
over to her patients.

Note that some critics of financial incentives might argue that
disclosure is not enough. These critics believe that financial incentives
constitute an impermissible intrusion into the fiduciary relationship
between physician and patient and should be prohibited altogether. In

the words of one critic, "physicians are required to do everything that
they believe may benefit each patient without regard to costs or other
societal considerations ....When practicing medicine, doctors cannot

serve two masters ....The doctor's master must be the patient."19 To

these critics, a breach of fiduciary duty can arise whenever a physician is
tempted by a conflict of interest, regardless of whether the conflict is
disclosed. Such a duty of absolute and undivided loyalty is imposed on
certain fiduciaries, particularly trustees, who are usually prohibited from
placing themselves in situations where conflicts of interest can arise. 9 '

However, imposing this type of strict obligation on physicians stretches
the fiduciary metaphor too far. There are several reasons for limiting

breach of fiduciary duty suits against physicians to cases involving
nondisclosure.
First, limiting a breach of fiduciary duty claim to nondisclosure
reflects the scope of the physician's fiduciary duty as outlined by the
courts. As discussed in Part I, fiduciary law has evolved by analogy.
190. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 515-16.
191. Norman G. Levinsky, The Doctor's Master, 311 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1573,
1573, 1575 (1984).
192. See, e.g., 90 C.J.S. Trusts § 248(a) (1955) (trustee prohibited "from placing
himself in any position where his self-interest will, or may, conflict with his duties as
trustee, or in a position where he will be exposed to the temptation of acting contrary to
the best interests of the beneficiaries."); 60 CAL. JuR. 3D Trusts § 160 (1994) (trustee
owes undivided loyalty to beneficiaries and cannot place himself in a position that would
expose the trustee to temptation of acting contrary to the beneficiaries' best interests,
irrespective of trustee's good or bad faith).
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Over time, courts have held that new relationships have many of the

same hallmarks as traditional fiduciary relationships. It would be a
mistake, however, to think that just because a court finds that a particular
relationship is a fiduciary one, it should be subject to the entire panoply
of fiduciary duties. As discussed in Part II, almost all of the court cases
that have discussed the fiduciary nature of the physician-patient
relationship have focused on the physician's fiduciary duty of disclosure.
Since this is the primary duty that courts have identified, this is the duty
whose breach should give rise to a cause of action. 93

Second, any outright prohibition or regulation of financial incentives
should come from the legislature, not the courts. The few courts that
have considered the issue have agreed. These courts have uniformly
held that the legitimacy of managed care in general, and financial

incentives in particular, is a question that should be left to the
legislature.194 Although there is a lot of debate about regulating financial
incentives, Congress and many state legislatures currently allow them.'95
Some states go beyond merely allowing them by explicitly encouraging

such incentives.'

As long as laws allow financial incentives, courts will

be putting physicians in an untenable position if they prohibit physicians
from considering them. While a plaintiff might be able to argue that
these payment arrangements must be disclosed, they will have a hard
time arguing that such arrangements, by themselves, constitute a breach
193. The other fiduciary duty that courts have identified is the duty of
confidentiality. This duty, while important, is not relevant to this article.
194. See, e.g., Pulvers v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 160 Cal. Rptr. 392, 394 (Ct.
App. 1979) (dismissing plaintiff's claim that HMO's financial incentives were fraudulent
by noting that financial incentives are authorized by federal Health Maintenance
Organization Act); BUSH v. DAKE, No. 86-25767 NM-2 (Circuit Court of Saginaw
County, Michigan, 1989), reprinted in Furrow et al., supra note 101, at 719, 721
(holding that it is for the Legislature, not court, to say whether HMO system of financial
incentives represents sound public policy).
195. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300e(c)(2) (1994) (stating that health maintenance
organizations may make arrangements with physicians and other providers to assume all
or part of the financial risk of providing medical care to members); NEv. REV. STAT. §
695G.040 (1998) (defining managed care as a system which encourages efficient use of
health care services by, among other techniques, offering financial incentives for
effective use of health care services); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I § 19-701(f)(5)
(1997) (allowing HMOs to pay physicians on a capitated basis, and to provide physicians
with an effective incentive to avoid unnecessary inpatient use).
196. See generally CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1342(d) (West 1990) (stating
that the intent of the Legislature in authorizing HMOs was to "assure the best possible
health care for the public at the lowest possible cost by transferring the financial risk of
health care from patients to providers").

of fiduciary duty.'97
Finally, breach of fiduciary duty claims should be limited to
nondisclosure because society simply does not expect physicians to
display an undivided loyalty to their patients. For example, although a
physician generally has a duty to keep a patient's medical information
confidential, that duty must give way if the patient presents a serious
threat of violence to others.'98 Triage presents another example of

society's expectation that physicians must sometimes consider things

other than their patients' best interests.' 99
In addition, many
commentators argue that encouraging physicians to consider the

financial ramifications of their medical decisions is a step to be
applauded rather than prohibited.'
Whether you believe in universal health care or making American
businesses more competitive, most people can probably agree that
keeping health care costs down is a worthy goal. And many

commentators believe that financial incentives are one of the most
effective ways to control health care costs by "ensuring that those who
make the spending decisions will bear the economic consequences of

their actions.""°' While individual patients may be better off under the
old fee-for-service system, society as a whole is better off when
physicians are encouraged to provide health care more economically.
Ironically, many people also believe that financial incentives are one

of the more benign managed care techniques.'
For example, one
prevalent alternative to using financial incentives is to require
preapproval for all tests, referrals, and inpatient or outpatient procedures.
This approval requirement is known as prospective utilization review.203
197. While such arrangements, by themselves, should not constitute a breach of
fiduciary duty, when they actually cause a physician to provide substandard care, the
plaintiff should be able to recover both compensatory and punitive damages.
198. See Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ., 551 P.2d 334, 340 (Cal. 1976).
199. The term triage refers to the screening of patients to determine who should be
treated first in times when medical resources are scarce. See GERALD R. WINSLOW,
TRIAGE AND JUSTICE 1 (1982). Often justified by the utilitarian maxim of doing the most

good for the greatest number, triage usually involves separating patients into three
groups: those who have little hope of survival; those who will survive without treatment;
and those who need treatment in order to survive. See id. at 1-11. Although triage has
its roots in military medicine, it has spread to mass disaster and emergency medicine.
See id. at 1, 12. More recently, the concept of triage has been used to allocate life-saving
medical technologies which are scarce, expensive, or both. See id. at 18-20.
200. See authorities cited supra notes 22 and 23.
201. E. Haavi Morreim, Diverse and Perverse Incentives of Managed Care:
BringingPatientsinto Alignment, 1 WIDENER L. Symp.J. 89, 90 (1996).

202. See, e.g., Frances H. Miller, Capitation & Physician Autonomy: Master of the
Universe or Just Another Prisoner's Dilemma?, 6 HEALTH MATRIX 89, 90-91 (1996)
(noting many extol capitation as means of restoring clinical autonomy to physicians).
203. See FuRRoW ET AL., supra note 101, at 321-23. Utilization review refers to the
process of evaluating the necessity and appropriateness of medical care. See id. at 321.
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Utilization review is usually performed by health plan employees. 4
They rarely see the patient, and instead base their decisions on the
physician's description of the problem and the application of a
preestablished, and sometimes inflexible, set of criteria. 20 5 Capitated
physicians, on the other hand, are often able to make treatment decisions
without HMO approval. Because of this, many champion capitation as a
way to get treatment decisions out of the hands of bureaucrats and back
into the hands of physicians.20 If you could choose whether treatment
decisions would be made by your own physician, financially
incentivized though she may be, or by a health plan's utilization
reviewer, who would you pick?
V. Is DISCLOSURE ENOUGH?
Knowledge is power.
-Francis Bacon
In the preceding section, I argued that courts should use fiduciary law
to compel physicians to disclose financial incentives which could effect
their professional judgment. In this section, I discuss both the limits of
disclosure and its benefits.
A. Limits of Disclosure
Compelling the disclosure of financial incentives will not solve all of
the problems that such incentives can cause. To a patient whose only
Utilization review can be performed by health care purchasers (i.e., employers), thirdparty payors, health care organizations, or independent utilization reviewer organizations
that contract with these entities. See id. at 321-22. Utilization review can be done before
treatment is performed, while treatment is being performed, or after treatment is
performed, See id. at 322.
204. Requests are usually reviewed by nurses first, but denials must be referred to
physicians. See id. at 322-23.
205. See id. at 321-23.

206. But see Miller, supra note 202, at 97-99 (noting capitation's potential for
increasing physicians' autonomy about treatment decisions, but arguing that this
potential can easily disappear if contracts with HMO impose other restrictions).
207. JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 158 (Justin Kaplan ed., 16th ed.
1992).

access to health care is through her HMO, disclosure might seem
thoroughly inadequate. After all, what options does such a patient have
in the face of disclosure? Recall the Jane Doe hypothetical. Assume
that Doe's doctor had told her how capitation worked when he told her
that she didn't need additional tests. What could Doe have done with
this information? According to the terms of her plan, all of her primary
care had to be provided, approved, or referred by her primary care
physician. Thus, unless her primary care physician approved it, the plan
would probably not pay for a second opinion from a different physician.
And even if the plan allowed her to pick a new primary care physician,
all primary care physicians face the same financial incentive to withhold
treatment.
Doe's other alternative would have been to use her own money to get

a second opinion from a neutral, non-plan physician; to see a specialist;
or to get some diagnostic tests. Doe's husband, you will recall, claims
that he and his wife would have gladly paid the cost of the $250 x-ray
that eventually diagnosed her cancer. While this would be an option for
some, many people could not afford to pay for a $250 test on their own.
Thus, the disclosure remedy will admittedly be more helpful to those
who can afford to pay for some of their own medical care."°8
Another problem with disclosure is its potential to weaken the doctorpatient relationship. Most doctors do put their patients' best interests
ahead of their own financial interests. But if they are forced to disclose
how they are paid by the HMO, their patients might become suspicious
about the physician's recommendations. Instead of seeing their doctors
as patient advocates, patients could start seeing their doctors as
adversaries. Since trust and confidence are so crucial to the doctorpatient relationship, disclosure could end up doing more harm than
good. It would be ironic if a remedy designed to stop the erosion of the
physician-patient relationship actually ended up hastening it.
Finally, many of those who agree that disclosure is an appropriate
remedy believe that it should come from the HMO rather than the
physician.0 9 While there is certainly merit to this view, compelling
208. See, e.g., Woolsey, supra note 101, at I (recounting the story of a woman who
raised money through a nationwide fund-raising campaign to pay for a bone marrow
transplant after her HMO refused to pay for the "experimental" procedure).
209. See, e.g., Michael J. Malinowski, Capitation, Advances in Medical
Technology, and the Advent of a New Era in Medical Ethics, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 331,

351-52 (1996) (noting that financial incentives should be disclosed to potential
subscribers before they pick their health plans); AMA, Ethical Issues in Managed Care,
supra note 68, at 335 (recommending that plan administrators disclose financial
incentives to patients). Note that several states are considering bills that would require
HMOs to disclose financial incentives. See, e.g., H.F. 2327, 80th Reg. Sess. § 2(1)-

(2)(a) (Minn. 1998) (requiring HMOs to disclose financial incentives to enrollees); A.B.
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HMO disclosure is complicated by the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA).'
ERISA was enacted to protect employee
pension and health care plans. 21' ERISA preempts all state law claims
that "relate to" such plans. 2 And although ERISA explicitly imposes
fiduciary duties on plans,2 3 the remedies for breach are meager.2 4 These

meager remedies make it unlikely that ERISA will prove very effective
in compelling HMOs to disclose financial incentives.
In addition to these meager remedies, courts are split over whether
beneficiaries can sue health plans for failing to disclose financial

incentives. In Shea v. Esensten,2 5 for example, the Eighth Circuit held
that an HMO can be held liable for breach of ERISA's fiduciary duties

by failing to disclose financial incentives. 21 6 In contrast, in Weiss v.
Cigna Healthcare, Inc.,2t7 the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York held that, while an HMO cannot deceive

or mislead plan beneficiaries, an HMO has no duty to disclose financial

incentives.2 1 Until either the Supreme Court or Congress resolves this
split, HMO disclosure is unlikely.' 9
2668, 207th Leg., 2d Ann. Sess. § 7(c)(2) (N.J. 1997) (same); H.B. 520, 100th Gen. Ass.
§ 11(b) (Tenn. 1997) (same).
210. ERISA is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (1994).
211. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a)-(c).
212. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). For an excellent discussion of the scope of ERISA's
preemption in suits against HMOs and of how HMOs have been able to hide behind
preemption to avoid liability for damages, see Susan 0. Scheutzow, A Frameworkfor
Analysis of ERISA Preemption in Suits Against Health Plans and a Call for Reform, 11
J.L. & HEALTH 195 (1996-97).
213. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (requiring plan fiduciaries to discharge duties
solely in interests of beneficiaries).
214. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a). Remedies are generally limited to recovery of
benefits due under the plan, or injunctive or declaratory relief. See id. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
Thus, in the Jane Doe hypothetical, if Doe wanted to sue her HMO, her recovery would
be limited to the cost of the additional tests she claims her physician dragged his feet on
ordering. The barium enema x-ray that eventually diagnosed her cancer cost $250. This
might be all Doe would be entitled to recover under ERISA.
215. 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 297 (1997).
216. Id. at 629.
217. 972 F. Supp. 748 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
218. Seeid. at755.
219. There are currently several bills pending in Congress that address this issue.
See, e.g., H.R. 1222, 105th Cong. § 713(h)(2) (1997) (requiring managed care plans to
"inform enrollees of the financial arrangements between the plan or issuer and
participating providers.., if those arrangements include incentives or bonuses for
restriction of services"); H.R. 586, 105th Cong. §§ 2(a)(1), 4(4)(A) (1997) (prohibiting
health plans from restricting physicians from disclosing financial incentives to patients);

S.449, 105th Cong. §§ 2(a)(1), 3(4)(A) (1997) (same).

Even if HMO disclosure were required, there is still a need for
physician disclosure. HMO disclosure would undoubtedly be made in
the plan booklet-a document given to HMO members that explains the
terms of the plan. It is doubtful that many people read this document
very carefully, if at all. Therefore, personal disclosure by a patient's
physician is a more effective way to make sure that patients know about
financial incentives.
B. Benefits of Disclosure
Despite the limits of disclosure, it has many potential benefits as well.
For example, disclosure cures what some critics see as the most
troubling aspect of financial incentives-their covert nature.w The
covert nature of financial incentives is problematic for three reasons.
First, failing to disclose these incentives is misleading to patients, who

trust that physicians are acting in their best interests. Second, the hidden
character of financial incentives makes it difficult for patients to link
them with adverse outcomes."' Jane Doe's husband was lucky; he found
out how his wife's physician was paid and will thus be able to raise this
issue in a lawsuit. But there are probably many others who are not so
lucky. These patients never think their adverse outcomes might have
been caused by financial incentives because they don't know about
them. Finally, as long as they remain hidden, financial incentives will
be difficult to monitor and respond to. Disclosure could lead to the
regulation or prohibition of the most offensive forms of financial
incentives."
Disclosure would also encourage patients to take a more proactive
approach to their health. For example, knowledge of financial incentives
might make patients question or challenge their doctors'
recommendations or insist on getting more information about their
diagnosis. In some cases, questioning by a patient might be the only
nudge a doctor needs. It is probably easier for a doctor to tell a patient,
"I don't think you need this test," when the doctor knows the patient is
ignorant of the fact that the costs of the test come out of the doctor's
own pocket. If the patient knows about the financial incentives, it might
be much more difficult for the doctor to deny care. Let's change the
Jane Doe hypothetical, to see how disclosure might have affected the
220. See McGraw, supra note 91, at 1836.
221. See id.
222. See Morreim, supra note 201, at 130 (arguing that the most offensive incentive
schemes are likely to disappear if disclosed); see also authorities cited supra note 26

(listing commentators who believe that certain financial incentives have a greater
potential for abuse than others).
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situation.
Jane Doe's doctor feels a palpable mass during a pelvic exam. He
performs an ultrasound, but the results are inconclusive. He tells Doe
the mass is "probably" a fibroid tumor, and that she shouldn't worry
about it. Jane, knowing that her doctor is financially rewarded for

keeping costs down, is not satisfied. She asks what additional tests are
available to establish that the mass really is a fibroid tumor. She also
asks what else a mass in the pelvic area could be and what tests are
available to diagnose these other possibilities. Doe's doctor tells her that
such a mass might indicate colon cancer, but that colon cancer is very
unlikely. Doe asks why, and the doctor explains that colon cancer is
extremely rare in those under forty with no family history of colon
cancer. He also explains that she doesn't have the usual symptoms of
colon cancer. Doe asks what those symptoms are, and the doctor
mentions rectal bleeding. Doe has been experiencing rectal bleeding.
She thought she had mentioned this at the beginning of the appointment,
but now she reiterates it. She tells her doctor that she would really feel
better if she could have the mass checked out more thoroughly. Since
their discussion has unearthed a symptom the doctor wasn't aware of,
and since he feels a little awkward that Doe knows he bears the costs of
the test, he agrees. Tests are performed; the cancer is discovered earlier,
and Doe survives.
This is, obviously, a fairy-tale happy ending, and I am not suggesting
that disclosure will always-or even often-lead to a similar result.
However, the hypothetical does show how disclosure could make
patients more proactive about their health and encourage communication
between patient and physician. Doe's questioning not only prompted
her doctor to reconsider his initial decision that more tests were
unnecessary, but it also highlighted symptoms that the doctor was not
focused on. Doe's knowledge of financial incentives made her a more
intelligent and informed health care consumer.

In addition to encouraging patients to challenge their doctors,
disclosure might encourage patients to challenge their HMOs. Most
iMOs, at least informally, allow patients to appeal denials of care.
Some states even require detailed appeals procedures. When financial
223.

See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY

CODE

§ 1368-1368.01 (Deering Supp. 1997)

(requiring IMOs to establish grievance procedures and resolve grievances within 30
days, or within five days in cases involving imminent and serious threats to patient
health).
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incentives are hidden, patients might not even suspect that care is being
denied when a doctor says, "you don't need to see a specialist."
Disclosure would increase patients' access to HMOs' appeals
procedures.
Finally, disclosure would help patients become more meaningfully
involved in the debate over managed care by making them more aware

of how much health care costs.

From the physician's perspective,

managed care is rapidly eliminating the incentives to overtreat that were
built into the fee-for-service system. However, managed care has done
little to change the patient's incentives. Many HMOs have actually
eliminated deductibles and coinsurance, and many HMO patients never
see a physician or hospital bill. Both developments have made patients
more isolated than ever from the costs of health care. Since patients
don't pay for the costs of office visits, diagnostic tests, or surgical
procedures, they have no reason to consider whether their health care is
being provided efficiently m And although "patients bear little of the
increased costs associated with high consumption of health care," they
stand to reap all the benefits.22' As one commentator has noted,
"patients' economic insulation has tended to breed a striking naivete
about the economics of health care, and an entitlement attitude
demanding an unlimited right to every possible benefit, regardless of the
cost or their own [in]ability to pay for it."'
Most people support managed care's goal of keeping health care costs
down. But as one commentator has noted, "[t]he trick... is to devise a
system wherein the incentives ... reinforce delivery of the kind of care
this country wants, at the price we are willing to pay for it." 7 It is
understandable that patients feel they are entitled to the best and most
aggressive health care money can buy when they do not directly bear the
costs of health care and have little idea of how high those costs can be.
In order for society to figure out how much it is willing to pay for health
care, patients need to have a better idea of how much it actually costs.
For example, assume a seriously ill patient is given two treatment
options, A and B. Treatment A has a 95% chance of success and causes
adverse, but non-lethal, reactions in 15% of all users. Treatment B has a
95.7% chance of success and causes adverse, but non-lethal, reactions in
224. See Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58 AM.
ECON. REV. 531, 535 (1968) (noting that "the response of seeking more medical care
with insurance than in its absence is a result not of moral perfidy, but of rational

economic behavior").
225, Rex O'Neal, Safe Harborfor Health Care Cost Containment, 43 STAN. L.
REV. 399,400 (1991).
226, Morreim, supranote 201, at 97.
227.

Frances H. Miller, Fonvord: The Promiseand Problemsof Capitation,22 AM.

J.L. & MED. 167, 172 (1996).
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3% of all users. Given only this information, most patients would
rationally choose option B. It has a slightly higher success rate and
fewer side effects. If patients were also told, however, that treatment A
costs $750 while treatment B costs $10,000, patients might reconsider.
At the very least, patients would be forced to consider whether a slight
increase in the chance of success is worth the extra $9,250. A
heightened awareness that this is the type of choice that doctors and
managed care plans face every day would encourage patients to get
involved in the debate over how our health care dollars should be spent.
CONCLUSION

Managed care's goal of reducing health care costs is an exemplary
one. But achieving this goal will not come without costs to both patients
and physicians. Under the old fee-for-service system, sick and anxious
patients who wanted the best care that money could buy could usually
find physicians who were happy to provide it and insurers who were
willing to pay. When insurers were unwilling to pay, physicians had
every incentive to advocate aggressively for their patients. Managed
care has cut down on the ability of patients to decide for themselves
whether to see a specialist or undergo a particular procedure and has
placed these decisions in the hands of physician-gatekeepers. Because
of this gatekeeper role, patients are beginning to see physicians as their
adversaries rather than their advocates.
Managed care has also affected physicians by forcing them to
explicitly consider, or personally bear, the costs of their treatment
decisions. Where physicians under the fee-for-service system were
rewarded for practicing defensive medicine, physicians under managed
care are rewarded for practicing cost-effective medicine. While this
shift in the way health care is delivered probably benefits society overall,
it can nonetheless prove detrimental to individual patients.
This Article has argued that courts should recognize that the
physician-patient relationship is a fiduciary one and that physicians have
a fiduciary duty to disclose managed care financial incentives to their
patients. When a physician breaches this duty, the physician should be
liable to the patient for all damages caused by the breach or for the
amount of the physician's income that is attributable to the undisclosed
incentives. Although disclosure will not return the physician-patient
relationship to the way it was before the advent of managed care, it will

empower patients by giving them the information they need to become
their own advocates.

